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This issue marks a transition of significance.  For much longer than I’vebeen editor, Professor Charlie Whitebread wrote an annual review of thepast Term of the United States Supreme Court.   He died in September,
and we are left without his help in keeping up with the latest developments.
We are also left without his great friendship, which is noted in a tribute on
page 88.  Because our readers and members have known Professor Whitebread
for so long, we also note at page 128 a full obituary you can find online.
I am quite pleased that Professor Chuck Weisselberg of Boalt Hall, the law
school at the University of California, Berkeley, has agreed to provide an
annual review of the Court’s criminal cases.  Professor Weisselberg has a
wealth of experience in teaching criminal law and procedure, including 11
years on the faculty with Professor
Whitebread at the USC law school before
Weisselberg headed to Berkeley in 1998.
Weisselberg has crafted his review in ways
that you will find helpful.  Not only has he
reviewed all of the key Supreme Court cases,
he has also reviewed what early lower-court
cases exist interpreting them.  And he has pre-
viewed for us the key cases being argued in
this Term.  If any of our readers have sugges-
tions of how to make these reviews even more
useful, please let me know.
Our second article reviews the use of a new technology to monitor those
accused or convicted of drunk driving while under court supervision.  The
new technology is a transdermal monitor, which can detect alcohol use from
the skin and sends a report electronically if a person being monitored is using
alcohol.  Researchers Gene Flango and Fred Cheesman report that an early
study shows that these devices are quite effective in preventing recidivism
during the period of monitoring.  They also recommend that combining treat-
ment with the use of a 24-hour monitor like this has significant promise for
changing offender behavior.
Our third article considers the intersection of laws allowing the use of mar-
ijuana for medical purposes and drug laws.  Law student Cameron Mustaghim
won the American Judges Association’s annual writing competition with this
article.  Mustaghim specifically reviews the possible reasons that a person
might have marijuana for medical purposes in his or her possession while dri-
ving a vehicle.   He concludes that courts should reconcile laws permitting
marijuana for medical purposes with other laws prohibiting drug possession
by generally presuming that a person transporting marijuana is doing so for
illicit purposes unless the drugs were purchased the same day.—Steve Leben
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
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In every issue of Court Review, some new members of the
American Judges Association are introduced to the AJA
through this column.  Others turn here for an update.   As the
AJA’s  new president, my first column is a good time to look
both backwards at recent activities and forward at the next
year’s work.
The AJA today has more than 2,000 members, including
judges at all levels of the judiciary—-trial and appellate judges,
general-jurisdiction and limited-jurisdiction trial judges, and
judges in both the United States and Canada.  In fact, we have
150 Canadian members, something that greatly enriches the
interchange at our annual educational conferences. 
In recent years, the AJA has continued its stellar efforts to
improve both the judiciary and the skills of its member judges.
We take great pride in the annual educational
conferences, which offer several days of top-
notch programming arranged by the AJA’s
Education Committee.  I have presented and
attended judicial educational programs in many
states and forms but I have never found better
programming than we offer at the AJA’s annual
educational conference.  I sincerely hope you’ll
make plans to join us in Las Vegas September 13
to 18, 2009, and give us a try.
The past two years have brought some innova-
tive new programming initiatives to the AJA.  Two years ago, the
AJA issued its first white paper:  Procedural Fairness:  A Key
Ingredient in Public Satisfaction.   That paper was approved by
the AJA in 2007 and formed the basis for the special issue of
Court Review you recently received.   The AJA’s paper was offi-
cially endorsed in July 2008 by the Conference of State Court
Administrators, which consists of the top judicial administrator
in each state.   The California court system has begun a major
program on procedural fairness, which began on its own but has
benefitted from AJA’s common efforts.  In addition, the authors
of the AJA white paper, Minnesota judge Kevin Burke, now AJA
secretary, and Kansas judge Steve Leben, AJA’s past president,
have presented the concepts set forth in the paper to more than
1,000 judges around the country, with additional presentations
in the works.   The paper, the special issue of Court Review, and
the educational presentations have helped judges to improve the
skill set needed to make sure that those who come through our
courts feel that they have been treated fairly.  
Last year, AJA introduced its Tell It to the Judge program.
Conceived by then-AJA president Eileen Olds and carried out
under the direction of a committee headed by Michigan judge
Libby Hines, judges in selected courtrooms in Arizona,
California, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, and Oregon sur-
veyed everyone who came through their courtrooms during the
week of July 14.  Designed as a pilot program, the one-page sur-
vey gave participating judges important feedback about the
perceptions of those who came through the court about fair-
ness and public satisfaction.  Research staff at the National
Center for State Courts helped with the project.
In the coming year, we plan to continue to expand the
breadth of our dynamic organization.  First, we will prepare a
new white paper focusing on the key areas of judicial wellness
and judicial stress.  The paper will address cur-
rent issues in the legal field and the relevance of
stress to those issues.  The paper will also offer
suggestions to our governing bodies as to the
maintaining of judicial wellness.  I believe that
this topic is of particular importance in these
times of economic crisis. With people losing
their jobs and homes, and with other financial
assets in jeopardy, demands on the judiciary as a
whole are bound to increase as well.  An effective
system of defining, recognizing, and handling
stress will allow judges to more effectively deal with this
increase both in our caseload and in the stress level of those
who come before us.
Second, we must encourage communication within the
court family.  As a result, I am working to further improve lines
of communication between AJA and other organizations that
have common interests.  This will include the National
Association for Court Management, the Conference of State
Court Administrators, and the National Court Reporters
Association.  All of us can be more effective through common
efforts.
Common efforts are also the key to a successful judiciary—
and to a successful AJA.  Let us know of ways we can be of
more help to you.  And please give consideration to attending
the AJA’s annual educational conference in September 2009 in
Las Vegas.  You will leave Vegas refreshed in your commitment
to being the best judge you can be and equipped with ideas that
can help you to achieve this goal, which is common to us all.
Court Review - Volume 44 87
President’s Column
Tam Schumann
On September 16, 2008, the
American Judges Association lost its
best and most loyal friend.  Law profes-
sor Charles H. Whitebread died that day
of lung cancer at the age of 65.
Anyone who ever attended an AJA
annual conference knew Charlie
Whitebread.  For more than 25 years
(no one I know can trace it back past
that), Charlie presented a review of the
past year’s decisions of the United States
Supreme Court at our conference—
every year, without fail, no matter where
we met or what date we chose for the
meeting.  And every year, without fail,
Charlie would end his program by say-
ing that the one thing we could be sure
of was that—if we invited him back—
he’d be at our next conference to tell us
what happened in the year to come.
If we invited him back?  Of course he
knew he was our most popular speaker.
He was the most popular speaker and
teacher everywhere he went.    
Charlie Whitebread’s reviews of the
Supreme Court were unlike any other.
He would open with a review of the most
tawdry gossip about the court he could
find from press reports and other sources
during the past year.  Now in truth, little
gossip about the Supreme Court and its
justices would meet an objective stan-
dard for tawdriness.  But Charlie
Whitebread was one of the great story-
tellers of our time, and he could make
just about anything seem extraordinary.
Those in the AJA who didn’t attend
an annual conference knew Charlie
Whitebread too.  In addition to his con-
ference presentations, he provided writ-
ten reviews of the past year’s cases in
Court Review, and he served on the edi-
torial board of this journal for the past
10 years.  But many of us also knew him
as one of the most popular presenters in
the country’s leading bar-review lecture
program.  
When a website (The Volokh
Conspiracy) posted news of Charlie’s
death, dozens of lawyers who had taken
courses from him either in the bar
review or in law school posted fond
remembrances.   Many of them gave
anecdotes that give a glimpse at his wit.
One recalled Whitebread predict-
ing—accurately—that a certain question
would always be on the bar exam for
one of two fact patterns and that the
answer would always be, “Murder.”
Whitebread’s explanation, “Why?
Because it’s the bar exam!”  Another
quoted him:  “If somebody’s dead, some-
body’s guilty.  Why?  It’s the bar exam!”
Another:  “Don’t be fooled by trick ques-
tions: ‘Is a lamp really a deadly weapon?’
It killed him, didn’t it?”  These tributes
came from people who had taken his
courses from the early 1970s to the past
year.  Charlie’s presentations were fun,
but he also made sure you’d remember
what you needed to know.
He lived life as fully as he lectured.
When he came for one of our programs
in Maui, though nearly 60 years old, he
went parasailing for the first time.  He
proudly showed the photo of his large-
framed body hanging in the air. 
Charlie’s final presentation to us, at
our 2007 annual conference, was a fit-
ting ending:  he made the presentation
with a member of the Court in the audi-
ence.   Our keynote presenter that year
was Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  When
we sent her the schedule and she saw
that Charlie Whitebread was going to
speak about her work for the past year,
she told us that she wanted to be there
for that.  And she wanted to have a
chance to respond!   Being very polite,
though, she said she’d like to do that if it
would be okay with Professor
Whitebread.
Charlie enthusiastically agreed, but
he did modify his presentation—even if
only a bit—with a justice in the audi-
ence.  He made these presentations from
several legal pads, which included some
pages with press clippings taped onto
them (part of the tawdry gossip) and
others with scrawled notes or quotes
taken from a case.  Charlie skipped a
couple of the gossip pages that year.
But he could afford to do that because
the year’s cases offered so much all by
themselves.  The hit of the presentation
was a discussion of a free-speech case
you couldn’t have made up if you’d tried.
A high school senior had unfurled a ban-
ner across the street from his Juneau,
Alaska, school that read, “Bong Hits 4
Jesus.”  The school principal, decidedly
not amused, suspended the student.
The Supreme Court upheld the restric-
tion on the student’s speech, concluding
that the school had a legitimate interest
in restricting speech that might encour-
age drug use.  (Justice Ginsburg joined
the dissenting opinion.) 
Blandly called Morse v. Frederick on
the Court’s docket, Charlie Whitebread
just kept calling it the “Bong Hits 4
Jesus” case.  You can imagine how much
fun he had telling us about that one.
Justice Ginsburg smiled and laughed
and thoroughly enjoyed his presenta-
tion.  We all did.
We will miss him.
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Footnotes 
1. 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
2. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
3. See State v. Rosch, No. 59703-5-I, 2008 Wash. App. LEXIS 2207
(Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2008) (unpublished decision); United
States v. Brunson, No.  07-4962, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19456 (4th
Cir. Sept. 11, 2008) (unpublished opinion); Reynolds v. Sherrod,
No. 08-cv-506-JPG, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60456 (S.D.Ill. Aug 08,
2008); United States v. Robinson, No. 07-CR-202, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60070 (E.D. Wisc. July 23, 2008); United States v.
Singletary, No. 5:08-CR-12(HL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61012
(M.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2008).  At least one court has rejected a claim
that such a prohibition is unconstitutional when the predicate
felony is not for a crime of violence.  See United States v. Westry,
No. 08-20237, 2008 WL 4225541 (E.D. Mich. Sept .9, 2008).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2007 Term had a sub-stantial and notable criminal docket.  There were very sig-nificant Second, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment decisions
as well as important rulings relating to basic habeas corpus
principles and federal statutes.  This article provides a selected
overview of the Term with a heavy emphasis on those cases
that may have the greatest impact upon the states.  The article
also suggests some questions left open by the Court’s opinions
and provides some preliminary indications of how several
decisions are being received in state and federal courts.  It con-
cludes with a preview of some cases to watch in the Court’s
current Term.
SECOND AMENDMENT
In District of Columbia v. Heller,1 possibly the most signifi-
cant criminal decision of the October 2007 Term, the Court
held that the Second Amendment confers an individual right
to keep and bear arms.  Respondent Heller, a law-enforcement
officer, sought to enjoin the District of Columbia from enforc-
ing its restrictive gun laws.  The District of Columbia essen-
tially prohibited possession of handguns.  It was a crime to
carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns
was generally prohibited.  There were additional restrictions
on keeping lawfully owned firearms loaded or without a trig-
ger lock; the law basically required lawfully owned firearms to
be immediately inoperable.  Heller lost in federal district court,
but the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms
and that the District’s laws violated that right.
The Supreme Court affirmed in a 5-4 opinion authored by
Justice Scalia.  The majority opinion begins with an analysis of
the text and history of the Second Amendment.  The amend-
ment contains an operative clause and a prefatory clause.  The
Court found that the operative clause – “the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” –  “guarantee[s]
the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of con-
frontation.”  The prefatory clause – “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State . . .” – fits with the
operative clause and does not restrict the right to possess and
carry weapons to members of an organized militia.  So cast, the
amendment protects “the inherent right of self-defense” and
extends to the home, “where the need for defense of self, family,
and property is most acute.”  The majority also found that its
construction of the Second Amendment was consistent with
interpretations of that provision from the period after ratifica-
tion through the end of the 19th century.  The justices charac-
terized the 1939 case of United States v. Miller,2 which found no
protected right to transport a sawed-off shotgun, as turning on
the lack of a relationship between that weapon and the types of
arms that a modern militia might use, rather than on the fact
that the defendants in the case were not themselves part of any
organized militia.  Finally, the Court’s opinion makes clear that
the Second Amendment does not prohibit restrictions on the
possession of firearms by felons and people who are mentally ill,
laws prohibiting carrying firearms in places such as schools and
government buildings, statutes placing conditions and qualifica-
tions on the commercial sale of firearms, and restrictions on
“dangerous and unusual weapons.”
The four dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s
view of the text and history of the Second Amendment and
would hold that legislatures can regulate the civilian use of
firearms as long as they do not interfere with the preservation
of a well-regulated militia.  In his dissent, Justice Breyer also
questioned how courts will determine whether a particular
firearm regulation is consistent with the amendment and
which constitutional standard courts will use.
Going forward, one might expect challenges to registration
laws that erect substantial barriers to possession of firearms as
well as challenges to laws that require weapons to be kept
unloaded or to have trigger locks or other devices that render
weapons immediately inoperable.  These, of course, were the
restrictions struck down in Heller.  We should also expect to see
some testing of the question of what other restrictions are rea-
sonable post-Heller and some difficult issues about whether
particular types of weapons are unusual or usual, and thus
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections.  In
the first three months following Heller, courts have upheld laws
prohibiting possession of firearms by felons,3 by individuals
90 Court Review - Volume 44 
Selected Criminal Law Cases in 
the Supreme Court’s 2007-2008
Term, and a Look Ahead
4. See United States v. Booker, No. CR-08-19-B-W, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61464 (D. Me. Aug. 11, 2008); United States v. White,
Crim. No. 07-361-WS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60115 (S.D. Ala.
Aug. 6, 2008).
5. See United States v. Knight, Crim. No. 07-127-P-H, 2008 WL
4097410 (D. Me. Sept. 4, 2008).
6. See People v. Lynch, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
July 16, 2008) (outside home); United States v. Dorosan, Crim.
No. 08-042, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51547 (E.D. La. July 7, 2008)
(post office); United States v. Hall, Crim. No. 2:08-6, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29705 (S.D. W. Va., Apr. 10, 2008) (concealed
weapon outside of the home); United States v. Walters, Crim. No.
2008-31, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53455 (D.V.I. July 15, 2008)
(within 1,000 feet of a school).  For an interesting post-conviction
challenge to a lengthy federal sentence (based on Heller), see
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment to Vacate Portion of Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255, in Angelos v. United States, No. 2:07-cv-936-TC (D. Utah),
filed Sept. 15, 2008.
7. See United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2008)
(machine gun and sawed-off shotgun); Mullenix v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, No. 5:07-CV-154-D,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51059 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2008) (reproduc-
tion of World War II-era machine gun); United States v. Lewis,
Crim. No. 2008-21, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51652 (D.V.I. July 2,
2008) (firearm with obliterated serial number).
8. The issue has been raised in a pending case, Nordyke v. King, No.
07-15763 (9th Cir.).
9. 128 S.Ct. 1598 (2008).
10. See State v. Logan, No. 07-CA-56, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2489
(Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 2008); United States v. Lopez, No. 07-
51037, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 14256 (5th Cir. July 7, 2008)
(unpublished decision).
11. See Rose v. City of Mulberry, Arkansas, 533 F.3d 678 (8th Cir.
2008); United States v. Gonzales, 535 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Wahl, No. 1:07cr18-SPM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43138 (N.D. Fla. May 30, 2008); see also United States v.
Strasnick, No. 08-PO-224 JLA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45353 (D.
Mass. June 10, 2008) (no Fourth Amendment violation in arrest
made by federal officer, where officer had probable cause but no
statutory authority to arrest); United States v. Wolf, No. CR. 07-
30102-01-KES, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62190 (D.S.D. Aug. 11,
2008) (no Fourth Amendment violation where tribal officers were
allegedly not properly commissioned).
12. See United States v. Franklin, No. 06-6499, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
14080 (6th Cir. July 1, 2008) (unpublished decision).
13. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
convicted of misdemeanor crimes involving domestic violence,4
and by people subject to restraining orders.5 Courts have like-
wise sustained restrictions on the possession of firearms in par-
ticular locations (or outside of the home)6 and laws relating to
sawed-off shotguns or unusual weapons.7 There is also the
question, which has been raised in the briefing in at least one
case, whether the Second Amendment should be incorporated
and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.8
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Court issued only one Fourth Amendment opinion
during the 2007 Term; it addressed the relevance of state law
in determining the reasonableness of an arrest.  The current
Term has a much more substantial search-and-seizure docket,
as noted at the end of this article.
The Respondent in Virginia v. Moore9 was arrested for driving
on a suspended license, a misdemeanor under Virginia law.  A
search incident to the arrest turned up cocaine and cash, and
Moore was subsequently charged with a drug offense.  He
moved to suppress the evidence, pointing out that Virginia law
does not generally permit an officer to arrest a defendant for
driving on a suspended license.  The Virginia Supreme Court
ruled that the search violated the Fourth Amendment since the
officer should have cited Moore instead of arresting him.  The
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  In an opinion by
Justice Scalia, the Court found that what is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment is not determined by state-law restric-
tions on searches and seizures.  If a state such as Virginia pro-
tects individual privacy more than the Fourth Amendment
requires, a defendant must look to state law for a potential rem-
edy rather than assert that suppression is required under the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule. Concurring, Justice
Ginsburg emphasized that Virginia law attaches only limited
consequences to a police officer’s failure to follow the
Commonwealth’s summons-
only instruction.
Moore has thus far been
cited to turn aside argu-
ments that officers who
allegedly arrested suspects
in violation of state law have
also violated the Fourth
Amendment.10 Several fed-
eral courts have relied on
Moore to overcome Fourth
Amendment objections
when state officers have
arrested individuals while
acting outside of the officers’
respective jurisdictions.11 A
federal court of appeals extended Moore to a case where a search
warrant was issued by a state court judge who allegedly lacked
authority to authorize a search outside of his county; a split
Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of evidence from the search
in a federal prosecution, albeit in an unpublished opinion.12
SIXTH AMENDMENT
This past year, the Court handed down several right-to-
counsel opinions with significant implications for trial courts.
The justices also tackled several important issues relating to
the Crawford v. Washington13 line of Confrontation Clause
cases.  One of the Term’s Crawford decisions interpreted the
“forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine.  The other Crawford case
concerned retroactivity rather than the contours of the
Confrontation Clause itself.
Right to Counsel
The most notable right-to-counsel decision of the Term was
Several federal
courts have relied
on Moore to 
overcome Fourth
Amendment 
objections when
state officers have
arrested individuals
while acting outside
of [their] 
jurisdictions.
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Rothgery v. Gillespie County,
Texas,14 which spoke to the
point at which the Sixth
Amendment attaches.  The
Petitioner was arrested on a
charge of being a felon in pos-
session of a firearm after a back-
ground check erroneously
showed a prior conviction for a
felony.  Officers took Rothgery
before a magistrate, who made a
probable-cause determination and set bail.  Rothgery posted
bail and was released.  He had no money for counsel and made
several oral and written requests for the appointment of a
lawyer, which went unheeded.  Rothgery was indicted almost
six months later and rearrested; he could not post a higher bail
amount and he was held in jail for three weeks.  Counsel was
eventually appointed.  The lawyer obtained Rothgery’s release
on bail and gathered paperwork showing that Rothgery in fact
had no prior felony conviction.  The charges were then dis-
missed.  Rothgery brought a federal civil rights action asserting
he would not have been rearrested and jailed for three weeks
had the county provided counsel within a reasonable period of
time following his initial arrest and appearance in court.  The
district court granted summary judgment to the county, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.  In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice
Souter, the Supreme Court reversed.
The majority opinion notes that the Court previously
pegged commencement of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceed-
ings, whether by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment.  The county argued
that the right to counsel did not attach at the initial appearance
before the magistrate, since (among other things) county pros-
ecutors were neither present nor had yet made an affirmative
decision to prosecute.  The Court rejected the county’s argu-
ment.  The opinion notes that the overwhelming consensus is
that the first formal proceeding is the point of attachment.  The
federal practice (including in the District of Columbia) and the
practice in 43 states is to take the first step toward appoint-
ment of counsel before, at, or shortly after the initial appear-
ance.  About seven states may delay appointment until some
significant time after the initial appearance; though the prac-
tice in those states is not entirely clear, the Court stated that
there is no justification for the minority practice of not
appointing counsel on the heels of the first appearance.  Once
the right to counsel has attached, an accused is at least entitled
to the assistance of counsel during any “critical stage” of the
proceeding.  In a part of the opinion that commanded five
votes, Justice Souter concluded that “counsel must be
appointed within a reasonable time after attachment to allow
for adequate representation at any critical stage before trial, as
well as at trial itself.”  A concurring opinion by Justice Alito
(joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia) argues that
counsel need not be appointed at any particular time, only so
far in advance of trial or any pretrial “critical stage” as to guar-
antee effective assistance at trial.  The matter was remanded to
determine whether the delay in appointing counsel prejudiced
Rothgery’s Sixth Amendment rights.
Rothgery is an important case on the question of when the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.  Although the
Court left significant questions open—most notably, the justices
declined to state any standard for when a delay in appointment
violates the Sixth Amendment—the decision may lead a number
of jurisdictions to review their practices.  As one example, in
July 2008, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided to bypass
Maryland’s intermediate appellate court and directly review the
question (raised in a class action lawsuit) whether indigent
defendants have a right to counsel at initial bail proceedings.15
Indiana v. Edwards,16 another significant Sixth Amendment
case, concerns the interplay of mental illness and the right to
self-representation.  Respondent Edwards was charged with
attempted murder and other offenses.  He was committed to a
mental-health facility after being found unfit to stand trial.  He
was eventually found fit and was tried almost six years after his
arrest.  Just before trial, Edwards moved to represent himself.
The judge denied the motion, and he was tried with counsel.
The jury convicted Edwards of several offenses but failed to
reach a verdict on the charges of attempted murder and battery.
Before his retrial, Edwards again asked to represent himself
because, among other things, he and his lawyer disagreed on
the defense to put forward.  The trial court found that Edwards
was competent to stand trial with counsel but was not compe-
tent to defend himself.  Represented by counsel, Edwards was
tried and convicted.  The Indiana appellate courts found that
Edwards was denied his right of self-representation under
Faretta v. California.17 The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
Indiana Supreme Court’s judgment in a 7-2 decision authored
by Justice Breyer.
The majority opinion states that “the Constitution permits
judges to take a realistic account of the particular defendant’s
mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to
conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”
Further, “the Constitution permits States to insist upon repre-
sentation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial
under Dusky [v. United States18] but who still suffer from severe
mental illness to the point where they are not competent to con-
duct trial proceedings by themselves.”  The majority found room
for this holding by distinguishing the Court’s earlier decision in
Godinez v. Moran,19 which assessed competency to waive counsel
under the same standard as competency to stand trial.  However,
Godinez sought to waive his right to counsel and plead guilty
14. 128 S.Ct. 2578 (2008).
15. See Richmond v. District Court, 952 A.2d 224 (Md. 2008) (grant-
ing petition for writ of certiorari on the court’s own motion).
Maryland is not one of the “minority” jurisdictions referenced in
Rothgery, but the Supreme Court decision may have influenced
this action by Maryland’s highest court.  Richmond is set for 
argument in January 2009
16. 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008).
17. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
18. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
19. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
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20. There have been only a handful of reported cases applying
Edwards in the three months since the decision issued–not
enough cases to discern any trend.  However, one case to note is
United States v. Duncan, No. CR-07-23-N-EJL, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57151 (N.D. Idaho July 29, 2008) where the court applied
the enhanced standard for competency to a defendant who
pleaded guilty but who sought to represent himself at the penalty
phase of a federal capital case.  The court found that Duncan met
that standard and permitted him to waive his right to counsel.
21. 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
22. See State v. McLaughlin, No. SC88181, 2008 Mo. LEXIS 153 (Mo.
Aug. 26, 2008); State v. Milan, No. W2006-02606-CCA-MR3-CD,
2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 26,
2008).
whereas Edwards intended to waive counsel and proceed to trial
on his own.  The Court in Edwards said that a different standard
for competency to waive counsel should apply when a defendant
intends to go to trial but declined the State’s request to promul-
gate a specific standard.  Rather, the majority indicated that trial
judges “will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned men-
tal capacity decisions, tailored to the individual circumstances of
a particular defendant.”
The decision drew a forceful dissent by Justice Scalia and
joined by Justice Thomas.  The dissenters criticized the major-
ity for finding that “a State’s view of fairness (or of other values)
permits it to strip the defendant” of the right to present his or
her own defense.  Justice Scalia wrote that the decision to waive
counsel usually harms the defendant’s case, but the choice is
respected because it is one that belongs to the accused.  The dis-
senters also called the majority’s holding “extraordinarily
vague,” noting that the Court did not state a specific standard
or even accept Indiana’s position that self-representation could
be denied if an accused cannot communicate coherently with a
court or a jury.
The Court’s opinion raises a number of questions.  One is the
extent to which Edwards opens a crack in the Faretta doctrine.  In
previous cases, the Court was fairly adamant that judges could
not deny a request for self-representation because an accused was
unskilled in presenting a case or because the defense was likely
to become a train wreck.  This decision leaves room for a trial
court to deny a request to waive counsel based upon an assess-
ment of the defendant’s ability to make reasoned choices with
respect to which defense to present or some other aspect of the
defense case, so long as such the assessment is made as part of a
competency determination.  And it is unclear just how much dis-
cretion has now been left to trial judges, though that discretion
may be quite substantial in light of the lack of a specific compe-
tency standard and the majority’s suggestion of deference to trial
court determinations.20
Confrontation Clause/Retroactivity
The Court also significantly limited an exception to the
requirement of confrontation.  In Giles v. California,21 the defen-
dant was convicted of first-degree murder following a trial in
which the jury was allowed to consider the decedent’s prior
statement to a police officer.  About three weeks before she was
killed, the victim reported that the defendant choked and threat-
ened her.  Her out-of-court statement was admitted because it
was deemed trustworthy, and she was of course unavailable to
testify.  Giles’s conviction was affirmed by the California appel-
late courts.  In a 6-3 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
decision.  As the justices previously held in Crawford v.
Washington, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
requires that a witness who has made a previous testimonial
statement be present at trial
for cross-examination.  If the
witness is unavailable, prior
testimony will be introduced
only if the accused had an
earlier opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.  The
Court had previously noted
two exceptions to this
requirement of a previous
opportunity to confront the
declarant: dying declarations
and “forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing,” meaning the introduc-
tion of a prior statement by a
witness who was detained or
kept away from the trial by
the defendant.  Giles pro-
vided the Court with the
opportunity to address the
contours of the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” exception.
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, concludes
that the exception should only be applied “when the defendant
engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testi-
fying.”  The majority drew support from the language of the
exception at common law, the absence of common-law cases
that admitted prior statements on a forfeiture theory where
there was no conduct designed to prevent a witness from testi-
fying, and especially the common law’s exclusion of uncon-
fronted inculpatory testimony by murder victims in the many
cases in which the defendant was on trial for killing the victims
but was not shown to have done so to prevent the victims from
testifying.  The Court vacated and remanded so that the
California courts could consider the defendant’s intent on
remand.
Dissenting, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Stevens and
Kennedy) argued that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception
was (and thus still should be) much broader than held by the
majority.  He also asserted that because the defendant knew that
killing the decedent would keep her from testifying, that
knowledge would be sufficient to demonstrate the intent that
law ordinarily demands.  The three dissenters would establish a
fairly capacious test of intent, rather than require a specific
showing of motive or purpose.
Several courts have applied Giles in the few months since it
was decided.  The Missouri Supreme Court and Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals have affirmed convictions, finding
that the exception applied and noting its particular relevance in
cases involving domestic violence.22 Two courts have made
clear that the standard of proof to demonstrate forfeiture is a
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23. See United States v. Taylor, No. 1:04-CR-160, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68122 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 5, 2008) (finding no forfeiture
under a preponderance-of-evidence standard); Milan, supra note
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24. 128 S.Ct. 1029 (2008).
25. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
26. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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preponderance of the evi-
dence.23
Danforth v. Minnesota24 is
another Crawford-related case,
but it addresses the power of
state courts to apply a new
decision retroactively on col-
lateral review; Danforth does
not concern the substantive
reach of the Confrontation
Clause.  It is significant to
underscore the greater avail-
able authority of the states (as
opposed to federal habeas
courts) to apply new rulings
retroactively.
The Petitioner in Danforth was convicted following a trial in
which the recorded statement of a six-year-old child was intro-
duced into evidence against him.  His conviction was made
final before the Supreme Court decided Crawford.  Although
the Supreme Court previously determined that Crawford estab-
lished a “new rule” that would not be retroactively applied in
federal habeas corpus proceedings25 under the principles of
Teague v. Lane,26 Danforth argued that the federal courts’ Teague
framework should not prevent state courts from developing
more generous rules of retroactivity.  In a 7-2 opinion authored
by Justice Stevens, the Court agreed.  Teague, the majority said,
addressed what constitutional violations might be remedied on
federal habeas corpus; it did not purport to define the scope of
any new constitutional right itself.  Teague’s general rule of non-
retroactivity was also “an exercise of this Court’s power to inter-
pret the federal habeas corpus statute.”  For these reasons and
others, the Teague rule limits the types of violations that will
entitle someone to federal habeas corpus relief but does not
affect a state court’s power to grant relief for violations of new
rules of constitutional law when the state is reviewing its own
convictions.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND JURY SELECTION
Snyder v. Louisiana27 is the most recent Supreme Court deci-
sion finding that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
under the principles set forth in Batson v.  Kentucky.28 Five
years ago, in Miller-El v. Cockrell,29 the Court held that the Fifth
Circuit erred in denying a certificate of appealability in a federal
habeas corpus case with a Batson claim.  When the case
returned to the Court several years later in Miller-El v. Dretke,30
the justices determined that the prosecution discriminated on
the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges.  In so
ruling, the Court compared the prosecution’s treatment of white
and nonwhite jurors.  In Snyder, the majority again applied a
comparative analysis and gave greater insight into the trial
judge’s role when there is a Batson objection.
During jury selection in Snyder, 36 prospective jurors sur-
vived challenges for cause.  Five of the 36 were black.  All five
were eliminated by the prosecution through the use of peremp-
tory challenges.  When Snyder’s case reached the Supreme
Court, the justices focused on the prosecution’s explanation for
two of the challenges.  Batson sets forth a three-step process to
adjudicate a claim that a peremptory challenge was based on
race-purposeful discrimination:  First, a party must make a
prima facie showing that the challenge was based on race.
Second, if that showing has been made, the party that exercised
the peremptory challenge must offer a race-neutral reason for
challenging the juror.  Third, in light of the parties’ submis-
sions, the trial court must decide whether the objecting party
has shown purposeful discrimination.  Snyder, like Miller-El II,
addressed Batson’s third step.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Alito, the Court found
that the prosecution’s reasons for striking a juror were not
shown to be race-neutral.  The prosecution offered two reasons
for challenging a black juror.  According to the prosecutor, the
juror looked very nervous.  In addition, he was a student
teacher who might miss classes, and the prosecution expressed
concerns about whether the juror might come back with a
lesser verdict due to a need to get home quickly.  The trial judge
denied defense counsel’s Batson objection, saying only that “I’m
going to allow the challenge.”  The trial court did not make any
findings about whether the juror in fact appeared nervous or
whether the prosecutor was credible.  Further, the case was
tried in one week, and it seemed clear that this juror would be
able to attend at least a weeklong trial.  And applying a com-
parative analysis, it appeared that the prosecution did not
express similar concerns with respect to white jurors who had
time constraints that were at least as serious as those of the
black juror.  The judgment was reversed despite the dissenting
opinion of Justices Scalia and Thomas, who criticized the
majority for second-guessing the fact-based decisions of the
Louisiana courts.
There are a few points to note.  The decision is an expression
of the Supreme Court’s continued concern with discrimination
in jury selection and an indication of the Court’s willingness to
review such cases.  The majority opinion also provides a second
recent example of comparative juror analysis in assessing the
credibility of a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations.  And the
decision underscores the importance of a trial judge’s on-the-
record findings about the credibility of the prosecution’s expla-
nations.  In the absence of anything in the record showing that
the trial judge believed the prosecution’s assertion that the chal-
lenged juror was nervous, the Supreme Court refused to pre-
sume that the judge found the offered race-neutral explanation
to be credible.
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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Kennedy v. Louisiana31 was the third case in the last half-
dozen years to hold that a capital sentence could not be
imposed on certain offenders or for certain offenses.  In Atkins
v. Virginia32 and Roper v. Simmons,33 the justices ruled that the
execution of mentally retarded persons and juveniles violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  In Kennedy, a 5-4
decision, the majority ruled that a death sentence for someone
who raped, but did not kill, a child and who did not intend to
assist another in killing the child also violates these amend-
ments.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, follows
the general approach of Atkins and Roper to gauge whether
there is a national consensus against capital punishment for the
crime of child rape.  In assessing whether a death sentence for
the crime is excessive or cruel and unusual, the justices looked
for objective indicia of societal standards and then analyzed
whether the sentence was disproportionate.  The majority
determined that of the 37 jurisdictions (six states plus the fed-
eral government) that have the death penalty, only six jurisdic-
tions authorize that sanction for rape of a child.  “The evidence
of a national consensus with respect to the death penalty for
child rapists . . . shows divided opinion but, on balance, an
opinion against it.”  Further, Louisiana is the only state since
1964 to have sentenced an individual to death for the crime of
child rape.  No individual has been executed for the rape of
either an adult or child since 1964, nor has anyone been exe-
cuted for any non-homicide offense since 1963.  The majority
also turned aside the claim that jurisdictions may not have
decided to authorize the death penalty for child rape because
states may have misinterpreted an earlier ruling (which prohib-
ited the death penalty for adult rape) as applying to child vic-
tims as well.  Then the justices applied their own judgment and
determined that in light of the legitimate purposes of punish-
ment, “the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for
rape of a child.”  In an opinion written by Justice Alito, four jus-
tices dissented, taking issue with virtually every aspect of the
majority opinion.
After the Court issued its ruling in June 2008, the State
sought rehearing.  As it turns out, the majority was not correct
to assert categorically that the federal government does not
authorize the death penalty for the crime of child rape.  The
military death penalty for rape has been in place for more than
a century.  The rehearing petition was denied, though Justices
Thomas and Alito would have granted the petition.  A state-
ment by the five majority justices argues that “authorization of
the death penalty in the military sphere does not indicate that
the penalty is constitutional in the civilian context.”34 Justices
Scalia and the Chief Justice concurred in the denial of rehear-
ing, though they asserted that the new evidence destroys the
majority’s claim that it was discerning a national consensus and
not just giving effect to the majority justices’ own preferences.35
Baze v. Rees36 was a much-
watched challenge to the admin-
istration of Kentucky’s lethal
injection protocol; indeed, the
case led to a de facto morato-
rium on executions in the
United States from the day after
certiorari was granted until the
decision issued.  
The federal government and
35 of the 36 death-penalty states
either require or permit execu-
tion by means of lethal injection.
At least 30 states, including
Kentucky, use the same combi-
nation of drugs in their lethal-
injection protocols.  The first drug, sodium thiopental, is a bar-
biturate sedative that induces unconsciousness.  The second
drug, pancuronium bromide, is a paralytic agent.  The third
drug is potassium chloride, which induces cardiac arrest.
Although it was conceded that if the three-drug combination
was properly administered there would be a humane death, the
Petitioners argued that there was a significant risk that
Kentucky’s procedures would not be properly followed.  In par-
ticular, the Petitioners alleged that the first drug (the barbitu-
rate) is critical and must be provided in sufficient quantity to
prevent severe pain and conscious suffocation when the other
chemicals are administered.  As part of their argument, the
Petitioners noted that veterinarians are prohibited from using
the second drug (the paralytic agent) in euthanizing animals in
the overwhelming majority of states.  By a 7-2 vote, but one
which failed to produce a majority opinion, the Court found
that Kentucky’s administration of its lethal-injection protocol
does not contravene the Eighth Amendment.  It is difficult to
derive a clear rule from the separate opinions in this case.
Perhaps the easiest way to understand the outcome is to com-
pare the three main substantive opinions, and then review the
separate opinions of Justices Alito, Stevens, and Breyer.
The judgment of the Court was announced by Chief Justice
Roberts in an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito.
The Chief Justice’s opinion focuses upon whether particular
procedures pose a substantial risk of serious harm, which must
be an objectively intolerable risk of harm.  The Chief Justice
rejected the claim that simply because an execution method
might result in pain, either by accident or because of an
inescapable consequence of death, there is the sort of objec-
tively intolerable risk of harm that amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Nor could the petitioners prevail simply by showing that there
is an alternative procedure, such as a single-drug protocol (bar-
biturates only) that may be preferred.  As the Chief Justice put
it, an alternative protocol “must effectively address ‘a substan-
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tial risk of serious harm.’”  The
alternative procedure “must be
feasible, readily implemented,
and in fact significantly reduce
a substantial risk of severe
pain.  If a State refuses to adopt
such alternative in the face of
these documented advantages,
without a legitimate penologi-
cal justification . . . , then a
State’s refusal to change its
method can be viewed as ‘cruel
and unusual’ under the Eighth
Amendment.”  Applying this
test, the Chief Justice found on
this record that the Petitioners
had not shown that the risk of
an inadequate dose of the first
drug, as it is administered in Kentucky, is substantial.  
Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred but rejected the Chief
Justice’s formulation.  As set forth in Justice Thomas’s concur-
rence, the two rejected “as both unprecedented and unwork-
able” any standard that might require courts to weigh the rela-
tive advantages and disadvantages of different methods of exe-
cution or lethal-injection protocols.  In their view, “a method of
execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliber-
ately designed to inflict pain.”  Thus, any comparative analysis
“should be limited to whether the challenged method inher-
ently inflicts significantly more pain than traditional modes of
execution such as hanging and the firing squad.”  Justice
Thomas also argued that “today’s decision is sure to engender
more litigation.”
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, dissented.  They
agreed with the Petitioners and the plurality “that the degree of
risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of alternatives must be
considered.”  However, they disagreed with the Chief Justice’s
opinion with respect to the extent to which the “substantial
risk” test “sets a fixed threshold for the first factor.”  Applying
this more flexible test, the dissenters would remand to consider
whether the failure to include additional safeguards to confirm
that the inmate is unconscious after injection of the barbiturate,
in combination with other elements of Kentucky’s protocol, cre-
ates an unacceptable and readily avoidable risk of inflicting
severe and unnecessary pain.  
Justice Breyer concurred.  He agreed with Justice Ginsburg
as to how a court should review this type of Eighth Amendment
claim.  However, he could not find in the record or in the liter-
ature sufficient evidence to establish that Kentucky’s execution
protocol poses the type of significant and unnecessary risk of
inflicting severe pain that the Petitioners asserted.  Justice
Stevens concurred, finding no Eighth Amendment violation on
this record under the test set forth in either the Chief Justice’s
opinion or Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.  He used this as an occa-
sion, however, to announce his general view that the death
penalty in the United States is now patently excessive and cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.  But being bound by precedent, he joined the
Court’s judgment.  Justice Scalia wrote separately to respond to
Justice Stevens.  Justice Alito wrote his own concurrence to
respond to the suggestion by Justice Thomas that the case
would result in greater litigation.
From the various opinions, there were three votes for the test
set forth in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, three votes for the
dissent’s more flexible test, and two votes for a test that essen-
tially compares modern protocols to the methods of executions
conducted throughout history.  Ordinarily, when five justices do
not agree on the rationale for a decision, the views of the mem-
bers who decide the case on the narrowest grounds represent
the holding of the Court.  There is an argument that Baze con-
tains no controlling opinion since it is difficult to characterize
any of the concurring opinions as providing a fifth vote on a
narrower ground than contained in the Chief Justice’s opinion.
Nevertheless, despite the Court’s failure to promulgate a single
standard, seven justices found that the administration of
Kentucky’s execution protocol did not violate the Eighth
Amendment on the record in this case.
In the immediate wake of the decision in Baze, the de facto
moratorium has lifted in a number of jurisdictions with execu-
tions taking place by lethal injection in at least Florida, Georgia,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
But because Baze reviewed only the specific record of
Kentucky’s procedures, litigation has continued as judges apply
Baze to evidence of the administration of lethal-injection pro-
tocols in other states.37 Most courts seem to treat Chief Justice
Roberts’s plurality opinion as controlling.38 Courts have tended
to dispose of lethal-injection challenges by comparing their
jurisdiction’s protocol with the evidence discussed in Baze
about the administration of Kentucky’s protocol.39
FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES AND SENTENCING
The last Term produced important rulings interpreting fed-
eral criminal statutes and affecting federal sentencing.  The arti-
cle summarizes a few of the statutory decisions, particularly
those that relate to the interplay of federal and state offenses
(Logan and Burgess) or apply to common add-ons for use of
weapons or explosives (Watson and Ressam).  The Court’s sen-
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tencing decisions are significant for both state and federal pros-
ecutions, as the Court has continued to enunciate principles
that apply in construing structured sentencing schemes. 
Federal Statutes
The Petitioner in Logan v. United States40 was convicted of
being a felon in possession of a firearm.  Under the Federal
Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), he was given an
enhanced sentence on the basis of three misdemeanor battery
convictions from Wisconsin.  The ACCA contains an exemp-
tion provision, providing that a prior conviction may be disre-
garded if it “has been expunged, or set aside,” or if the defen-
dant “has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.”
Logan argued that because he never lost his civil rights as a
result of the three misdemeanor convictions, they fell within
the exemption provision and his federal sentence was improp-
erly enhanced.
The Court unanimously rejected the argument in an opinion
written by Justice Ginsburg.  Relying upon the plain language,
history, and context of the statute, the Court found that never
having rights taken away was not the same as having them affir-
matively restored.  While the ACCA defers to a state’s decision
to relieve an offender from the disabling effects of a conviction,
Congress did not mean to exempt instances where the offender
did not lose civil rights in the first place.  Thus, if a state intends
to allow an individual to avoid the ACCA consequences of cer-
tain convictions, it must act affirmatively to do so.
In Burgess v. United States,41 the Court resolved a conflict in
the way that prior state convictions might be used to enhance a
federal drug sentence.  Some federal drug offenses carry manda-
tory minimum penalties.  A 10-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) is doubled to 20 years if
a defendant has previously been convicted of a “felony drug
offense.”  The Petitioner in Burgess had a prior conviction in
South Carolina for possessing cocaine.  The State classified the
offense as a misdemeanor although it carried a maximum sen-
tence of two years’ imprisonment.  Burgess claimed that the
State’s characterization must control, relying upon 21 U.S.C. §
802(13), which says that a “felony” is any “offense classified by
applicable Federal or State law as a felony.”  The government
countered that the controlling definition was the term “felony
drug offense,” described in 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) as an offense
involving drugs that is “punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year under the law of the United States or of a State or
foreign country.”  The district court and court of appeals agreed
with the government.  The Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court unanimously ruled that the definition set forth in
§ 802(44) alone controls.  In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg,
the justices point to a number of statutory features, including
that “felony drug offense” is a term of art within the statute and
the specific definition should control.  The Court also deter-
mined that the rule of lenity would not apply since there was
no ambiguity to resolve.  The specific statutory definition set
forth in § 802(44) is coherent, complete, and exclusive.
Watson v. United States42
addressed the question of
whether a person who trades
drugs to obtain a gun “uses” a
firearm “during and in relation
to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime”
as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 924
(c) (1) (A).  The Petitioner in
Watson told a government infor-
mant that he wanted to acquire a
gun.  The informant suggested
he could pay in narcotics.
Watson met with the informant
and an undercover law enforce-
ment agent.  He provided the
drugs in exchange for a semiautomatic pistol.  Watson was
indicted for a drug offense and for “using” the pistol during and
in relation to that crime.  He entered a conditional plea, reserv-
ing the right to challenge the factual basis for his conviction.
The court of appeals affirmed.  The Supreme Court unani-
mously reversed.
In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court determined that
someone who provides drugs to obtain a weapon does not “use”
the weapon.  Though the justices previously decided in Smith v.
United States43 that trading a weapon to receive drugs is the
“use” of that weapon, the converse is not true.  Under the
Court’s precedents, “use” requires active employment of a
firearm.  Focusing on the plain language of the statute and its
context, the justices found that a person who gives drugs to
receive a weapon does not actively employ or use the gun.
Justice Ginsburg concurred to urge the Court to overrule Smith.
She also wryly noted that “at least when the subject is guns,”
“[i]t is better to receive than to give.”
Ressam v. United States44 involved an interesting (though less
common) offense and a direct link to the “war on terror.”
Ahmed Ressam came to the United States with explosives, plan-
ning to detonate them at the Los Angeles International Airport.
He was arrested entering the country and made false statements
on a customs declaration.  He was convicted in federal court of
a number of criminal offenses, including carrying explosives
“during the commission of any [federal] felony” in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2).  The government’s theory was that
Ressam had carried explosives during the commission of the
felony of making false statements on a customs declaration.
The court of appeals reversed his conviction on the § 844(h)(2)
count, finding that the carrying of the explosives had to be in
relation to the commission of the other felony, and that no such
relationship was shown here.  Attorney General Michael
Mukasey personally argued on behalf of the government in the
Supreme Court, which reversed by a vote of 8-1.
The Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, provides
that the plain language of the statute requires reversal.  The term
“during” denotes a temporal link to the other felony, but the
statute contains no other qualification.  The statute merely
In Burgess v.
United States, the
Court resolved a
conflict in the
way that prior
state convictions
might be used to
enhance a 
federal drug 
sentence.
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requires that an explosive be
carried contemporaneously
with the commission of
another felony not that it be in
relation to or somehow further
the commission of that felony.
Although the Court was con-
cerned during oral argument
that a broad construction of
the statute could lead to
absurd results or give extraor-
dinary leverage to prosecutors,
the majority opinion does not
address those concerns.  They
are reflected in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Breyer, who
argues that because the term
“explosives” includes such
commonplace materials as gasoline or fertilizer, and the category
of federal felony offenses is so broad, the Court’s construction
may lead to strange results.  From the context of the statute, he
would find a requirement that the explosives be carried in rela-
tion to the other felony.
Federal Sentencing
The Court has been extraordinarily active over the last
decade in reviewing the constitutionality of federal and state
sentencing schemes.  Some of the most important decisions in
recent years include Blakely v. Washington45 and Cunningham v.
California,46 where the justices found that sentences imposed
under Washington’s guidelines and California’s determinate-
sentencing law violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury, and United States v. Booker,47 where the Court essentially
saved the United States Sentencing Guidelines by rendering
them “effectively advisory.”  Two cases decided on the same day
last Term dealt with some of the impact of making the Federal
Guidelines advisory.  If judges are no longer strictly bound by
the Guidelines, what force do they carry?  Must judges respect
all policy determinations that are reflected in Guidelines
ranges?  And how do courts of appeals review sentencing deci-
sions that substantially depart from applicable Guidelines
ranges?
In Kimbrough v. United States,48 the Petitioner was convicted
of serious federal drug and weapons offenses.  The drug crimes
involved crack as well as powder cocaine; for over 20 years,
federal crack-cocaine offenses have carried higher Guidelines
and statutory sentences than offenses related to powder
cocaine.  The statutory minimum for Kimbrough’s offenses was
15 years, though his guideline range was 228-270 months (19
to 22 1/2 years).  The guideline range for an equivalent amount
of powder cocaine would have been 97-106 months.  Taking
into account the much criticized distinction between crack-
and powder-cocaine sentences, the district court sentenced
Kimbrough to the statutory minimum of 15 years.  The court
of appeals vacated the sentence, but the Supreme Court
reversed.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court
noted that sentencing judges may vary from Guidelines ranges
based upon policy considerations, including disagreement with
a policy of imposing much higher sentences in crack-cocaine
cases.  The majority specifically rejected the government’s argu-
ment that federal courts are required by Congress to respect the
100:1 ratio of amounts of powder to crack cocaine that lead to
equivalent Guidelines ranges.  While courts must still give
“respectful consideration” to the Guidelines, they are freed
from this ratio and the mandatory strictures of the Guidelines.
District courts should follow the instruction in Booker that sen-
tences must be imposed that are sufficient but not greater than
necessary to accomplish the various goals of sentencing
described in federal statutes.  Justices Thomas and Alito dis-
sented.  Justice Thomas continues to disagree with the remedial
holding in Booker.  Justice Alito would require sentencing
judges to give significant weight to the policy decisions in the
Guidelines (including, as here, various ratios), and would thus
remand for reconsideration.
Gall v. United States49 addressed a somewhat different prob-
lem:  how to review the reasonableness of a federal sentence
that is substantially below the applicable Guidelines range.  The
Petitioner in Gall joined a drug conspiracy but withdrew on his
own and stopped selling drugs of any kind.  Gall was arrested
for conspiracy several years later, after he graduated from col-
lege and found a job.  He pleaded guilty.  The applicable
Guidelines range was 30-37 months, but the judge sentenced
him to three years’ probation, which the district court reasoned
was sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the statu-
tory purposes of sentencing.  The court of appeals reversed.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.
In a 7-2 decision and an opinion by Justice Stevens, the
majority found that the sentence was reasonable.  While a pre-
vious ruling of the Supreme Court had determined that in the
ordinary case a reviewing court may presume that a sentence
within the Guidelines is reasonable, all sentences are reviewed
under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.  Though the
extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the
recommended Guidelines range is relevant, the Court rejected
a rule that would require extraordinary circumstances or some
specific showing to justify a sentence that is outside of the
Guidelines or even outside of the Guidelines range by a partic-
ular degree.50 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
because its analysis appeared to resemble de novo review.  The
circuit failed to give due deference to the sentencing court’s rea-
soned decision that the statutory factors, on the whole, justified
the sentence.  As in Kimbrough, Justices Thomas and Alito dis-
sented.
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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Boumediene v. Bush51 was one of the blockbusters of the
Term.  Although the ruling directly concerns detainees at
Guantánamo Bay, whose cases are pending before a limited
number of courts, the decision should be of interest to a wide
audience.  Boumediene is now the leading case on the
Suspension Clause,52 the scope of common-law habeas corpus,
and what procedures might provide an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus.
In previous rulings, the Court determined that the privilege
of habeas corpus extends to detainees at Guantánamo Bay.
Further, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) did not
remove then pending habeas corpus cases from the federal
courts.  In response, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).  In Boumediene, a 5-4 major-
ity found, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, that the MCA was
intended to strip pending cases from the federal courts.
However, because the Act did not purport to be a formal sus-
pension of the writ, the detainees could still challenge the
legality of their confinement.  The question then became
whether the MCA could avoid a Suspension Clause challenge
because Congress has provided adequate substitute procedures
for habeas corpus.  
To answer this question, the majority set out some basic
principles of common-law habeas corpus.  The privilege of
habeas corpus “entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportu-
nity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erro-
neous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.”  A habeas
corpus court must have the power to order the conditional
release of someone who is unlawfully detained, although
release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appro-
priate remedy in every case in which the writ is granted.  The
majority opinion also notes that “where relief is sought from a
sentence that resulted from the judgment of a court of record,
as is the case in most federal habeas cases, there is considerable
deference owed to the court that ordered confinement.”  Of
course, the criminal conviction “in the usual course occurs
after judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the out-
come and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own
independence.”  But where a person is detained by executive
order rather than after trial and conviction in a court, “the need
for collateral review is most pressing.”  The Court then
reviewed the few previous cases finding that statutory proce-
dures were adequate substitutes for the writ, such as the deci-
sion upholding 28 U.S.C. § 2255–the motion procedure that
allows federal prisoners to challenge their convictions and sen-
tences, and a case upholding restrictions on successive petitions
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which
were found not to amount to a substantial departure from com-
mon-law habeas corpus.  
The majority ruled that under these principles, and by con-
trast with these prior cases, the procedures afforded to
detainees at Guantánamo Bay are not an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus.  To begin with, the administrative forum for
contesting detention–the Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT)–constrains a detainee’s
ability to rebut the factual basis
for the claim that the person is
an enemy combatant.  There is a
limited means to find or present
evidence, and the detainee does
not have the assistance of coun-
sel.  There is a risk inherent in
any process that is closed and
accusatorial, said the Court, and
the risk is too significant to
ignore given that the consequences of error may be detention
for the duration of hostilities that could last a generation or
more.  In addition, the DTA affords only limited judicial review
of the administrative determination.  Because a reviewing court
is essentially limited to the question of whether the CSRT fol-
lowed appropriate and lawful standards and procedures, it can-
not consider newly discovered evidence that could not have
been part of the administrative record, and that evidence might
be critical to a detainee’s argument that he is not an enemy com-
batant.  
In light of the CSRT process, the majority concluded that the
detainees’ access to the courts under the statutory review pro-
visions of the DTA is not an adequate substitute for the writ of
habeas corpus.  Thus, the MCA–which would strip federal
courts of the power to consider habeas petitions by these
detainees–effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.  
Four justices dissented.  The dissenting opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts takes on, among other points, the majority’s
finding that the CSRT and DTA procedures are not adequate
substitutes for the writ of habeas corpus.
Though Boumediene directly applies to a limited number of
individuals, it should stand as a cornerstone case on the mean-
ing of the Suspension Clause, the scope of common-law habeas
corpus, and on which procedures may be an adequate substi-
tute for habeas corpus.
In Allen v. Siebert,53 a much less momentous case (but one
still worthy of comment), the Court granted the State’s petition
for a writ of certiorari and summarily reversed the court of
appeals.  The case is notable for its explanation of how a state’s
dismissal of a post-conviction petition may impact the timeli-
ness of a subsequent federal habeas corpus petition.
Siebert filed his state post-conviction petition after the expi-
ration of a state statute of limitations, and it was dismissed as
untimely.  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 contains a one-year statute of limitations that is tolled
while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
or claim is pending.”54 Siebert filed a federal habeas corpus
petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely.  The
federal court of appeals disagreed, finding that Siebert’s state
petition was “properly filed” because the time bar was not juris-
dictional and the state courts had discretion whether to enforce
it.  In so ruling, the circuit distinguished a prior case from the
Court in which a petition was not found to be “properly filed”
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where the state’s time bar was jurisdictional.55 Reversing, the
Supreme Court said, in a per curiam opinion, that whether a
time limit “is jurisdictional, an affirmative defense, or some-
thing in between,” it is a condition to filing.  Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg dissented and would have adopted the distinction
found by the court of appeals.
A LOOK AHEAD
An early look at the Supreme Court’s October 2008 Term
shows that the Fourth and Sixth Amendments are back on the
menu, along with issues relating to qualified immunity for offi-
cers and prosecutors, and a matter of particular importance to
capital defendants.  Though these cases are significant, there do
not yet seem to be the same sort of blockbusters that marked
the October 2007 Term’s criminal docket.
As of the opening of the October 2008 Term, the Court has
granted review in four search-and-seizure cases:  Herring v.
United States,56 which asks if evidence must be suppressed
under the Fourth Amendment where officers conduct an arrest
and search incident to an arrest in reliance upon credible but
erroneous information provided by another officer; Arizona v.
Gant,57 which concerns whether officers must demonstrate a
threat to their safety or a need to preserve evidence to justify a
warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest after the vehicle’s
recent occupants have been arrested and secured; Arizona v.
Johnson,58 which addresses whether an officer who stops a car
for a minor traffic infraction may pat-down a passenger if the
officer has an articulable basis to believe that the passenger is
armed and dangerous but the officer has no reason to believe
that the passenger is committing a criminal offense; and
Pearson v. Callahan,59 which asks, among other things, whether
a “consent once removed” exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement authorizes police to enter a home without
a warrant after an informant buys drugs inside.  
Pearson may also provide a vehicle for a significant qualified
immunity ruling.  The justices directed the parties to brief and
argue whether the qualified immunity decision in Saucier v.
Katz60 should be overruled.  A second case involving qualified
immunity is Van De Kamp v. Goldstein,61 which asks whether the
doctrine shields the decisions of supervisors who direct policy
and oversee training with respect to prosecutors’ constitutional
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.
The Court has agreed to hear two Sixth Amendment right-
to-counsel cases.  Kansas v. Ventris62 asks whether the prosecu-
tion may impeach a defendant with statements obtained with-
out a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.  In Montejo v. Louisiana,63 the justices will
decide if, after the Sixth Amendment has attached, a defendant
who asks for counsel and is appointed a lawyer must take an
affirmative step to “accept” the appointment to receive the pro-
tections of the amendment and preclude police-initiated inter-
rogation without counsel. 
Other provisions of the Sixth Amendment are also before
the Court.  Vermont v. Brillon64 asks whether trial delays relating
to the appointment and representation of counsel may be attrib-
utable to the state and deny a defendant a speedy trial.  A
Crawford case is on the docket.  Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts65 concerns whether a state forensic analyst’s lab-
oratory report, prepared for use in a criminal case, is “testimo-
nial” evidence that is subject to the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause.  In Rivera v. Illinois,66 the Court will take
up the question whether the erroneous denial of a defendant’s
peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal of a convic-
tion.  And the justices have granted review in another
Apprendi/Blakely case.  In Oregon v. Ice,67 they will decide
whether the Sixth Amendment requires that facts necessary for
the imposition of consecutive sentences, other than facts relat-
ing to prior convictions, must be found by the jury or admitted
by the defendant.
An important case for capital defendants is Harbison v. Bell.68
Typically, state clemency proceedings are at the end of the road;
they come after a death sentence has been affirmed by the state
courts and after the defendant has lost his or her federal habeas
corpus petition.  Harbison will decide whether the statute that
provides federal funds for counsel who represent state capital
defendants in federal habeas corpus proceedings includes fund-
ing for counsel to continue their representation and pursue
State clemency proceedings.
All-in-all, the October 2008 Term promises a bevy of impor-
tant criminal law and procedure decisions, even if it lacks some
of the fireworks provided by last year’s headliners.
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Traditional sentencing sanctions have not been particularlyeffective against people caught driving while impaired(DWI) and less so against repeat offenders. Technology
has provided judges with some new sentencing options,
including various forms of electronic home monitoring.  This
article takes an initial step toward evaluating the effectiveness
of alcohol monitoring as a sentencing option in DWI cases
with the goal of eventually determining which types of offend-
ers, if any, would benefit most from alcohol monitoring. The
constant monitoring of alcohol consumption is thought to aid
rehabilitation by providing a deterrent to drinking and a posi-
tive reinforcement to sobriety. It permits offenders to remain
employed, to fulfill family obligations, and to remain in treat-
ment.
Judges may be less familiar with transdermal methods that
monitor alcohol through the skin than with blood, breath, or
urine testing.1 There are two transdermal measuring devices—
the Wrist Transdermal Alcohol Sensor (WrisTAS) by Giner,
Inc., and the Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitor
(SCRAM) bracelet by Alcohol Monitoring Systems, Inc. The
former device, though clinically tested, is not yet commercially
available perhaps because it is not yet sufficiently water or tam-
per resistant.2
This article reports on the results of a preliminary study
using SCRAM—a passive system that provides 24-hour moni-
toring of alcohol consumption.3 SCRAM, which became com-
mercially available in 2003, is attached to the ankle and detects
alcohol from continuous samples of vaporous or insensible
perspiration (sweat) collected from the air above the skin and
transmits that data via the web.4 Anti-circumvention features
include a tamper clip, an obstruction sensor, a temperature
sensor, and communication monitoring to ensure that the
bracelet is functioning normally and transmitting information
on the designated offender.  
At the request of Alcohol Monitoring Systems, the National
Center for State Courts (NCSC) conducted a preliminary
examination of the SCRAM bracelet to determine its effective-
ness in reducing recidivism while it was worn and after it was
removed.  One purpose of the study was to determine the key
influences on the effectiveness of the SCRAM bracelet so that
a more extensive, experimental study could be designed.
Another purpose was to develop hypotheses with regard to the
types of offenders on whom the SCRAM bracelet is most likely
to be effective so that judges can determine which offenders
would most benefit from the use of SCRAM.  Alcohol
Monitoring Systems recommends its use for repeat “hard-core”
offenders.5
This preliminary study was dependent upon available data
so it was not possible to explore all of the implications of the
SCRAM bracelet.  In particular, we lacked information on the
treatment options used by offenders while the SCRAM bracelet
was being worn.6 Consequently, this can only be presented as
preliminary findings until a more extensive, experimental
study can be conducted.  Nevertheless, there are some key
lessons that judges may take from this early research. 
THE CONTEXT FOR ALCOHOL MONITORING
Before presenting the key findings from our research, let us
put alcohol monitoring in context of other sentencing options.
The most prevalent sanctions imposed against people con-
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victed of driving while impaired are incarceration, community
service, fines, and license suspension.7 These sanctions have
been an effective deterrent for many types of crimes but appear
to be less effective for DWI offenders. 
Incarceration involves some form of
correctional supervision.  Many states
have adopted mandatory jail sentences
for misdemeanor DWI and prison sen-
tences for felony DWI.  Incarceration,
however, is expensive.  Although many
participants in a NHTSA survey
expressed a fear of jail, many said jail
alone would not change their behavior.8
Only slight evidence exists that jail sen-
tences reduce recidivism.9 Incarcera-
tion, however, can also be an opportu-
nity to place offenders into residential
treatment programs, such as special
DWI facilities or weekend intervention
programs.10
Fines have not been well evaluated
for their impact on recidivism.  They
may be effective deterrents if set high
enough, but many fines are not col-
lected or can be paid in small increments over a long period of
time and, thus, do not place a substantial financial burden on
the offender.11
Respondents to the American Judges Association’s survey
suggested that suspended sentences and community service
were the least effective sanctions against DWI.  A majority of
people with revoked or suspended licenses drove anyway,
according to the NHTSA survey mentioned above, but tried to
be more careful so they wouldn’t be detected.12 Similarly, an
extensive study in Louisiana, using both self-reports and crash
data, did not find evidence of reduced recidivism for offenders
sentenced to community-service pro-
grams.13
The effectiveness of probation in
preventing DWI recidivism depends,
in large part, on the conditions
imposed and the level of supervision
associated with the probation.
Variations include basic supervision
probation (monthly visits), unsuper-
vised probation, and individualized
restrictions.  Intensive supervision
probation provides offenders with
more contact with probation officers
and participation in education and
therapeutic programs in the commu-
nity.14 Under intensive supervision,
offenders retain their freedom but are
subject to requirements such as cur-
fews, electronic monitoring, drug test-
ing, daily contacts, and mandatory
community service.15
Electronic monitoring is as effective as incarceration, and
less expensive.16 Courts use electronically monitored home
detention to limit the nighttime and recreational driving of
DWI offenders and use other devices to electronically monitor
breath alcohol concentration.17 For example, in a DUI
Intensive Supervision Program in Multnomah County Circuit
Court, Judge Dorothy Baker uses an electronic monitoring and
a telephone-based remote-alcohol-testing device in conjunc-
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tion with drug testing,
intensive probation, or
court-based tracking, but
the distinguishing features
of this program are the
requirements that offenders
submit to polygraph tests
and sell all vehicles they own. 18
STUDY DESIGN 
The conclusions in this study are based on a comparison of
offenders who wore the SCRAM ankle bracelet in North
Carolina over the past two years.  How did the characteristics
of SCRAM wearers compare to the pool of nearly 3,000 offend-
ers (2,985 to be precise) who did not wear the SCRAM ankle
bracelet?
• Age: Those sentenced to the SCRAM ankle bracelet were
almost three years younger on the average than other offend-
ers.
• Race:  Those sentenced to wear the SCRAM ankle bracelet
were more likely to be white and less likely to be Hispanic
than other offenders. 
• Sex:  Those sentenced to wear the SCRAM anklet were pre-
dominantly male, and the female population was about
equal proportionally to the pool of offenders (11.4% and
13.5%, respectively).  
• County: Almost all of those sentenced to the SCRAM ankle
bracelet were from Mecklenburg and Gaston counties, but
the offenders in the pool were primarily from Mecklenburg,
Wake, and Buncombe counties.
• Recidivism: After the ankle braclet was removed, the
recidivism rate of the 114 SCRAM wearers was 17.5% com-
pared to a rate of 26.9% for the offenders as a whole.  This
difference is significant in that it could occur by chance less
than three times in a hundred. SCRAM wearers tended to
recidivate sooner than other offenders, 221 days versus 275
days, respectively, but that difference was not statistically
significant. 
Two caveats are necessary here: 
(1) This recidivism figure is an overall rate and does not
take into account differences in characteristics of
SCRAM wearers versus the general offender popula-
tion, such as age and race. 
(2) Although recidivism is perhaps the best measure of
success available, it is flawed because it depends not
only upon the offender driving while impaired but
also being caught driving while impaired.  That at
least partially depends upon the levels of enforce-
ment in each community.  It is not only possible, but
likely, that many people drive impaired numerous
times before they are apprehended.  One survey esti-
mated that the number of times a person drives
drunk before being arrested is 300.19
To overcome, the first of these difficulties, 114 SCRAM
wearers were matched more closely with a subsample of the
entire pool of 2,985 offenders.  This matching led to a com-
parison group of 261 people who were similar to SCRAM wear-
ers in:
• age (33.6 years old versus 32.8 years old for the SCRAM
sample); 
• race (37.5% nonwhite versus 27.2%); 
• sex (13.4% female versus 11.4%); and 
• county where conviction took place. 
Even after matching on these characteristics, however, there
were some differences between the SCRAM users and the com-
parison group:
• number of prior DWI offences (1.5 versus 1.1 for  SCRAM
group);
• prior offenses in general (6.1 versus 7.5); and 
• number of charges (1.5 versus 1.2). 
It appears as if judges are selecting the more serious, repeat
offenders as candidates for the SCRAM ankle bracelet.
Comparing those offenders sentenced to wear SCRAM
bracelets with this matched set of offenders leads to the pre-
liminary conclusions listed below. 
RESULTS FROM THE PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF
SCRAM 
SCRAM WORKS BEST WITH REPEAT OFFENDERS
Comparing the SCRAM ankle bracelet wearers to the
matched comparison set diminishes the difference in recidi-
vism rates to the point where the differences are not statisti-
cally significant.  The recidivism rate for any crime for the
SCRAM wearers was 17.5% compared to 20.3% for the
matched group. If the comparison is restricted to only the
more “hard-core” offenders, the differences are more pro-
nounced.  When only offenders with at least two prior offences
are considered, the differences in recidivism between SCRAM
wearers at 15.7% and the matched set at 28.6% were much
greater. 
When considering prior DWI offence recidivism only, the
differences were 2.6% for SCRAM wearers versus 4.6% for the
comparison group.  The tendency for SCRAM wearers to
recidivate sooner than other offenders continued with the
matched group (221 days versus 296 days respectively).
Electronic monitoring
is as effective as
incarceration, and
less expensive.
20. The multivariate technique employed here is a survival-analysis
technique known as “Cox regression.”
21. As one caveat, it must be noted that data from the SCRAM group
was available for 3,000 days post-arrest and from the comparison
group only 1,500 days post-arrest, so it is not possible to deter-
mine what happened to recidivism of the comparison after 1,500
days, whereas it is possible to determine that recidivism for the
SCRAM group stabilized after 1,240 days. 
22. Minnesota Department of Corrections, “Remote Electronic
Alcohol Monitoring 2004 Report,” as quoted in Judge Michael
Barrasse, “Promising Sentencing Practice No. 6: Electronic
Monitoring and SCRAM,” in W. Brunson and P. Knighten (eds.)
Strategies for Addressing the DWI Offender: 10 Promising Sentencing
Practices (Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 2004), p. 38. 
23. J. Mejeur, “Ignition Interlocks: Turn the Key and Blow,” State
Legislatures (December 2007),  16-21 at 21.
24. For purposes of comparison, it is interesting to note that the Utah
Sentencing Commission notes that suspensions must last at least
three months to be effective in reducing recidivism and ideally
should last between 12 and 18 months with respect to another
intervention or license suspensions. Mike Haddon, Gary
Franchina, and Ron Gordon, DUI Best Sentencing Practices
Guidebook (Salt Lake City: Utah Sentencing Commission), chap-
ter 3.
25. D. Marlowe, D. DeMatteo, and D. Festinger, “A Sober Assessment
of Drug Courts,“ 16 Federal Sentencing Reporter (2003) 1-5.
26. Robert S. Gable and Kirkland R. Gable, “The Practical Limitations
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Compendium (September/October, 2007), p. 40. 
27. V. E. Flango and C.R. Flango, “What’s Happening with DWI
Courts?” in C.  Flango, C. Campbell and N. Kauder (eds.), Future
Trends in State Courts, 2006 (Williamsburg, VA: National Center
for State Courts). 
After statistically controlling for multiple differences
between the SCRAM wearers and other offenders,20 SCRAM
users have a lower probability of recidivism than the matched
set until a long time after their arrest (1,240 days or 3.4 years),
when they become more likely to recidivate than their com-
parison group.21
SCRAM IS EFFECTIVE WHEN WORN
People are very unlikely to recidivate while wearing a
SCRAM anklet. In our sample of 114 people wearing the
SCRAM bracelet, only two committed a new offense while
wearing the anklet.  This result is consistent with the findings
of the effectiveness of Minnesota’s Remote Electronic Alcohol
Monitoring (REAM) program, which found that very few
arrests for new DWI offenses occurred while participants were
enrolled in the program.22 In that respect, the SCRAM ankle
bracelet may be analogous to ignition interlock devices.
Recidivism rates for ignition interlocks decreased between 50%
and 95% while on the automobile, but once it is removed,
“recidivism rates gradually increase to match the rates of those
who never had an ignition interlock.”23
SCRAM NEEDS TO BE WORN AT LEAST 90 DAYS
A key factor in determining the effectiveness of the SCRAM
ankle bracelet is the length of time it is worn.  The ankle
bracelet should be worn at least 90 days although that is the
very minimum amount of time needed to remain sober while
on a treatment program for alcohol and/or drug addiction.24
Offenders who wore the SCRAM bracelet at least 90 days and
who had at least two prior DWI convictions had a lower prob-
ability of re-offending than other DWI offenders. 
In comparison to the matched set, offenders who wore the
SCRAM anklet for more than 90 days recidivated at half the
rate of offenders who wore the ankle bracelet for less than 90
days (10% versus 20%).  The recidivism rate of SCRAM users
that wore the anklet for less than 90 days was nearly identical
to the rate of offenders who did not wear a SCRAM bracelet.
Research indicates that 90 days may be the minimum thresh-
old to have treatment take effect.  For addictions in general, six
to twelve months of treatment may be necessary to achieve
sobriety.25
SCRAM SHOULD BE
USED IN COMBINATION
WITH TREATMENT
The treatment model
focuses on protecting public
safety by attacking directly
the root cause of DWI:  alco-
hol and substance abuse.
There is little in the litera-
ture about alcohol-monitor-
ing devices, or electronic
monitoring devices in gen-
eral, to suggest that moni-
toring in and of itself will
have a long-term influence on offender behavior.  SCRAM, as
well as other monitoring devices, should be used in conjunc-
tion with treatment for alcohol and drug addiction to keep
offenders sober long enough for treatment to have an impact.
Compliance with treatment is verified by frequent testing for
alcohol and drug abuse, close community supervision, and fre-
quent court hearings.  Incentives are most effective if they
occur shortly after progress is made.  Positive monitoring can
be used to “document and reinforce small behavioral improve-
ments while they are occurring in the offender’s usual social
environment.”26
SUMMARY
The ever increasing cost of incarceration and the lack of
success of traditional sentencing sanctions have caused courts
to explore other alternatives.  The growth in DWI courts27 has
resulted in extending the length and increasing the intensity of
offender monitoring to allow time for that treatment to work.
DWI courts are expensive to operate in part because of the cost
of monitoring, which is why alcohol-monitoring solutions are
promising.  SCRAM is a particularly promising alternative
because it not only deters recidivism while in operation but,
when used in combination with treatment, also allows for the
possibility of changing offender behavior.
The American Correctional Associations’, Standards for
Electronic Monitoring Programs suggests an individualized plan
should be completed for each offender before a personal mon-
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28. American Correctional Association, Standards for Electronic
Monitoring Programs (Laurel, MD: American Correctional
Association) 1995.
29. See, e.g., A. H. Crowe Offender Supervision with Electronic
Technology: A User’s Guide (Lexington, KY: American Probation
and Parole Association, 2002). 
itoring device is installed.28 Other professional guidelines sug-
gest a risk assessment.29 A comparable set of criteria may be a
good idea for judges as well.  
To develop such a plan, judges need to know which candi-
dates are best for each sentencing alternative. This study
attempted to examine the offenders who would most benefit
from the use of a SCRAM ankle bracelet.  Although based upon
a decent sample size, this preliminary study was conducted in
only one location and did not have the luxury of using random
assignment of offenders to SCRAM to produce definitive con-
clusions.  Much more work is needed to determine the types of
treatment options best used in conjunction with the SCRAM
bracelet to reduce recidivism or at least to increase the time
until the next offense.  
Nevertheless, this preliminary study was able to produce
the findings discussed above. Key among these findings are: 1)
The SCRAM ankle bracelet is most effective when used with
hard-core offenders who had at least two prior DWI convic-
tions; 2) SCRAM is effective when worn; 3) SCRAM sentences
are not be recommended for periods of less than 90 days;
indeed, the ankle bracelet may need to be worn for six months
or a year to be most effective.  
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Footnotes
1. City of Garden Grove v. Super. Ct. of Orange Co., 157 Cal. App.
4th 355 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2007).
2. “Diversion” of medical marijuana, as hereafter used, means any
nonmedical purpose or use but especially distribution, sharing,
resale, and recreational use.
3. Further references to “patient” or “caregiver” means a “qualified
patient” and “primary caregiver,” respectively, within the mean-
ing of California’s medical marijuana laws.  Cal. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 11362.7(d), (f) (Lexis 2008).
4. While this article considers medical marijuana laws in general, it
surveys California law in particular.
5. As will be discussed, persons possessing quantities above the
general quantity guideline limits are likely not in compliance
with medical marijuana laws and are subject to criminal prose-
cution; thus, the presumption need not apply to them because
their conduct is already unlawful.
6. NORML, Working to Reform Marijuana Laws,
http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=3391 (updated Dec.
01, 2004).
7. Maryland merely limits penalties to a $100 fine after a successful
defense of medical need.  Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 5-
601(c)(3)(ii) (Lexis 2008).
8. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 475.320(1)(a) (Lexis 2007).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2B-3(A) (Lexis 2008); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 69.51A.040(3)(b) (Lexis 2008).
10. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.77(a) (Lexis 2008).
In November 2007, a California Court of Appeal issued a
decision in Garden Grove v. Superior Court1 that requires local
police officers to return medical marijuana to a qualified
patient, despite a lawful search and seizure subsequent to a
moving motor vehicle violation.  The effect of this ruling, in at
least some instances, will be to place marijuana back into the
hands of a person who is a risk to public safety while driving
under the influence or is engaged in the “diversion”2 of med-
ical marijuana through unlawful transporting.
A qualified patient is authorized to possess and use medical
marijuana that adheres to certain general quantity guidelines.
While adhering to the general quantity guideline limits for
which possession is allowed by law, a person could transport
marijuana for his or her use and thereafter drive under the
influence or, alternatively, could unlawfully divert medical
marijuana for nonmedical purposes.  States have the right to
exercise their police powers for the benefit of public health,
safety, and welfare.  This article proposes a presumption limit-
ing a qualified patient or primary caregiver’s3 right to transport
medical marijuana within a motor vehicle to protect against
driving under the influence, reduce unlawful diversions, and
ensure compliance with medical marijuana laws.4 This pre-
sumption, under certain circumstances, allows for a forfeiture
of medical marijuana that is presumably possessed for non-
medical purposes.
In addressing the Garden Grove decision, this article relies
upon public safety and public policy to justify the forfeiture
and destruction of medical marijuana following lawful seizure
from a motor vehicle.  This presumption, while making an
exception for the initial procurement of medical marijuana,
presumes that a patient or caregiver who has direct and imme-
diate control of a motor vehicle is transporting the medical
marijuana for nonmedical use.  Notably, the presumption
would only apply to persons whose possession adheres to the
general quantity guideline limits.5
The rationale for the presumption is that there is no reason
that a patient or caregiver should be driving while transporting
marijuana, with the exception of same-day procurement, and
thus, the impermissible transporting of medical marijuana
should result in forfeiture.  This, in turn, prevents the mari-
juana from being returned to the patient or caregiver and acts
as a deterrent to transporting marijuana for nonmedical pur-
poses or in situations that can adversely affect public safety.
I. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL 
MARIJUANA LAWS
A. LIMITATIONS ON AMOUNTS FOR POSSESSION 
AND USE
Currently, there are 13 states with laws related to medical
marijuana:  Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine,
Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Washington.6 The allowable limit of
marijuana that may be legally possessed spans from none in
Maryland7 to 24 ounces in Oregon,8 with Washington and New
Mexico allowing a 60-day and 90-day supply,9 respectively, as
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13. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.71(a)(1) (Lexis 2007).
14. Id. § 11362.71(e).
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22. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
23. People v. Strasburg, 148 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1059 (Cal. App. 1st
Dist. 2007).
24. Id. at 1055.
25. Id. at 1055-1056. 
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determined by the state health department.  Most states allow
possession of between one to eight ounces of marijuana.
California permits a qualified patient or primary caregiver to
possess up to eight ounces under general quantity guidelines,10
but they may possess a greater quantity, upon physician’s rec-
ommendation, if their medical needs so require.11
B. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND PROTECTION
GENERALLY
While states generally afford legal protections to qualified
patients and their primary caregiver, the means by which these
protections are invoked varies.  Nearly every state allows the
use of its statutes to be employed as an affirmative defense
against prosecution.12 Most states have mandatory registration
and identification programs, though participation is voluntary
in California.13 Many states, including California, allow pro-
tection from arrest and prosecution for qualified patients and
primary caregivers who are registered cardholders in compli-
ance with state law requirements.14 When the qualified patient
or primary caregiver is neither a registered cardholder nor in
full compliance, as for example when his or her possession
exceeds the general quantity limit, the qualified patient or pri-
mary caregiver may invoke the statutory protections by way of
an affirmative defense.15 This is true in California since the
qualified patient or primary caregiver need not be registered to
avail themselves of the afforded protections.16
C. EXCEPTIONS FOR ENDANGERING OTHERS
AND/OR USE WHILE IN A MOTOR VEHICLE
Though medical marijuana laws (“MMLs”) vary in the
degree of protection they afford to qualified patients and pri-
mary caregivers, most states provide exceptions to the protec-
tions granted by their MMLs.  These laws prohibit qualified
patients and primary caregivers from “engaging in conduct
that endangers others”17 and/or prohibit the use of marijuana
while in an operated motor vehicle.18 California also precludes
protection for conduct that diverts marijuana for nonmedical
uses.19
D. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REQUIRED RETURNS OF
MARIJUANA FOLLOWING SEIZURE
States also differ in their treatment of seized marijuana
and/or paraphernalia following a situation where prosecution
was not initiated or was dismissed because the possession was
deemed non-criminal.  Most MMLs protect marijuana and
paraphernalia as property
that must be returned to a
qualified patient or primary
caregiver who is in lawful
possession.  Some states,
such as California, did not
enact such a provision as part
of its MMLs and look to other
statutes20 and decisional law
for clarification of the issue.
Notably, Vermont is sui
generis in specifying that,
under its medical marijuana
laws, law-enforcement officers are expressly not required to
return marijuana or paraphernalia following a seizure.21
II. EFFECT OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS ON VEHI-
CLE SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND ARRESTS
A. MOTOR VEHICLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
Generally, “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred.”22 In addition, probable cause will per-
mit a warrantless search of an automobile with the scope of the
search extending to “every part of the vehicle and its contents”
that might contain the items actually sought.23
B. EFFECT OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS ON
VEHICLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
California courts have explained the effect of California’s
Compassionate Use Act (“CUA”) upon law-enforcement inves-
tigations.  In People v. Strasburg, a police officer encountered
Strasburg parked in his car immediately after he had smoked
marijuana.24 Strasburg notified the officer of his status as a
qualified patient and produced his prescription.25 The issue
was whether the officer had probable cause to search Strasburg’s
car and, consequentially, whether detaining and frisking him
was lawful since he was a qualified patient under the CUA.26
The court held the CUA “does not impair reasonable police
investigations and searches.”27 The court stated the CUA pro-
vides limited immunity, as opposed to a shield from investiga-
tion, and held that the officer was entitled to search and inves-
tigate to determine if Strasburg was acting lawfully because
probable cause existed after the officer smelled the marijuana.28
Strasburg’s conviction was upheld because he possessed 23
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43. The California legislature has recently passed a bill to overturn
the decision handed down by the California Supreme Court in
Ross.  On February 21, 2008, Assembly Member Leno introduced
Assembly Bill 2279, which has successfully passed both houses
as of August 29, 2008.  The proposed law permits an employee
or prospective employee to assert a cause of action against an
employer who discriminates against him or her on the basis of
the employee’s status as a qualified patient or for taking adverse
action after the employee fails a drug test.  However, the pro-
posed law is inapplicable to those employed in a “safety-sensitive
position” and does not preclude the employer from taking
adverse action against an employee who is impaired at work or
during work hours.  Legis. Counsel of Cal., Bill Information,
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“Enrolled” bill in HTML or PDF (accessed Sept. 28, 2008).
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ounces of marijuana.29
While voters approved the
CUA in 1996,30 the Medical
Marijuana Program Act
(“MMPA”) was enacted in
2003 to “address additional
issues that were not included
within the [CUA] and that
[needed to be resolved to pro-
mote its] fair and orderly
implementation . . . .”31 While
the CUA only applied to pos-
session and cultivation,32 the
MMPA extended patient and
caregiver protections to the acts of transporting, maintaining
or allowing a place to be used for marijuana related activity,
and nuisance.33 The MMPA affords immunity from arrest and
prosecution,34 as discussed above, to a qualified patient or pri-
mary caregiver who is registered, has an identification card,
and is in compliance.  The Supreme Court of California, in dis-
cussing the CUA as an affirmative defense, said that “immunity
from arrest is exceptional and, when granted . . .  is granted
expressly.”35 Such is the case for a registered patient or care-
giver with an identification card, but only if such persons com-
ply with MML provisions.36
III. THE GARDEN GROVE DECISION WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF CALIFORNIA’S MEDICAL MARI-
JUANA LAWS
A. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS OF
CALIFORNIA’S MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS
The Supreme Court of California specifically addressed the
purpose and scope of the CUA in Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm.,
Inc.37 In Ross, the plaintiff, a qualified medical marijuana user,
sued his employer after being terminated for failing a pre-
employment drug test.38 Ross asserted his employer needed to
afford him a reasonable accommodation and his termination
was wrongful as against public policy.39 The court held Ross
could not state a valid disability discrimination claim or
wrongful termination claim.40 The court reasoned that CUA
was not intended to alter employment relationships.41 Rather,
the CUA’s purpose is to provide seriously ill Californians with
the right to obtain and use physician-recommended marijuana
for medical purposes while ensuring that qualified users and
their primary caregivers are not subject to criminal prosecu-
tion or criminal sanction.42 The employee’s termination was
upheld since the CUA speaks exclusively to the criminal law.43
Finally, in addition to purpose and scope, the Ross court
also addressed the CUA’s limitations.  In particular, the court
explicitly rejected the assertion that the CUA created a broad
right to use marijuana without hindrance or inconvenience,
since the measure did not purport to change the laws affecting
public intoxication, nor did the CUA “supersede legislation
prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that endangers
others,” the latter being expressly codified.44
B. MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS AS A DEFENSE TO
CRIMINAL TRANSPORTATION
Given the manner in which the CUA and MMPA were
enacted, there has been some inconsistency with respect to
whether California’s MMLs provide a defense to a criminal
charge of transporting marijuana.  The Supreme Court of
California, in People v. Wright,45 addressed the issue of trans-
porting under California’s MMLs, noting a conflict between the
appellate court decisions in People v. Trippet46 and People v.
Young.47
In Trippet, the court recognized that the CUA might
impliedly afford a defense to transporting marijuana.48 In that
case, the defendant’s vehicle was stopped for not having a
license plate lamp light.49 Upon smelling marijuana, the police
officer searched the car and confiscated approximately two
pounds.50 Trippet was charged with both transporting and
possession.51 The Trippet court held that although the CUA
did not expressly provide a defense to transporting, it might
impliedly provide such a defense in some situations depending
upon the quantity transported and the method, timing, and
distance of the transportation to determine whether the trans-
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port reasonably related to the patient’s medical needs (here-
after the “Trippet test”).52 The case was remanded to determine
whether Trippet was a qualified patient and what amount of
marijuana was authorized by her physician.53
However, the Young court expressly rejected the CUA as
affording a defense to a charge of transporting.54 In Young, an
officer observed a car swerve on the highway.55 Upon investi-
gation, the officer asked Young if drugs were in the car.56
Young admitted the presence of marijuana, but provided a
physician’s statement authorizing use.57 The Young court held
the CUA does not provide a defense to transporting marijuana
as it unambiguously covers only possession and cultivation.58
Young’s conviction for transporting marijuana was affirmed.59
In Wright, the Supreme Court of California indirectly
endorsed the Trippet test with respect to transporting cases.
Defendant Wright was found to be in possession of several
bags of marijuana weighing just over a pound after officers
investigated a tip that his car smelled of marijuana.60 He was
charged with possession for sale, transporting, and driving on
a suspended license.61 Before trial, he pled guilty to the license
charge and, at trial, defended the remaining charges upon the
grounds that he was a qualified patient who preferred to ingest
marijuana rather than smoke it, which was why he asserted he
possessed greater than a pound.62 Wright was convicted of
possession for sale and transporting after the trial court refused
a CUA defense jury instruction.63 The issue was whether the
CUA provides a defense to a charge of transporting and
whether it was reversible error to refuse such an instruction.64
While acknowledging that the Trippet test continues to be a
useful analytical tool, the court held the transporting issue
related to the CUA was moot since the newly enacted MMPA
had extended protections to charges of transporting.65 The
court found that Wright would be entitled to a CUA defense,66
as expanded by the MMPA and under the facts of his case, but
his conviction was upheld.  Since the jury was given the option
of convicting him for the lesser included offense of possession,
it had resolved, albeit implicitly but necessarily, that Wright’s
conduct was not for personal medical use when it convicted
him for sales.67
In addition to addressing whether the CUA, as expanded by
the MMPA, afforded a defense to transporting, the court
addressed what must be proven for a defendant to invoke an
affirmative defense under the CUA.  In particular, the Wright
court noted that the defendant has the burden to produce evi-
dence that: 1) he is a quali-
fied patient; 2) the quantity
possessed was authorized
pursuant to a physician’s
recommendation; and 3)
the marijuana is for the
defendant’s own personal
medical use.68
C. THE GARDEN
GROVE DECISION
As mentioned above,
Garden Grove v. Superior
Court69 addressed the right
of a qualified patient to have marijuana returned to him or her
after it was lawfully seized subsequent to a valid traffic stop.  In
Garden Grove, defendant Kha was stopped for running a red
light.70 Kha consented to a vehicle search and officers recov-
ered a pipe and 8.1 grams of marijuana that Kha claimed he
obtained from a lab in Long Beach.71 Though Kha produced a
seemingly valid doctor’s referral, the police seized the mari-
juana and cited Kha for running the red light and unlawful
possession of less than an ounce of marijuana while driving.72
Kha subsequently “pled guilty to the traffic violation, but . . .
contested the drug charge.”73 After Kha’s doctor verified that
Kha was authorized to use marijuana for medical reasons, the
prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge, but opposed Kha’s
request to return the marijuana.74 The trial court ordered that
the marijuana be returned to Kha.75 The City of Garden Grove
(“the City”) filed a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition
“directing the trial court to vacate its order and enter a new one
denying Kha’s motion for a return of [the marijuana].”76 The
Attorney General of California defended the trial court’s order,
as amicus curiae.77
The issue before the Garden Grove court was whether police
may deny the return of marijuana that was lawfully seized dur-
ing a vehicle search because returning it would result in a vio-
lation of the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).78
The City asserted Kha was not entitled to the protections of
the CUA and MMPA because Kha 1) obtained his marijuana
illegally, 2) did not have a qualifying illness, and 3) was not
charged with a requisite offense covered under the CUA or
MMPA since he was cited for possessing marijuana while dri-
ving in violation of the Vehicle Code.79 The court rejected all
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of these arguments stating,
respectively, 1) the CUA and
MMPA afford protection
without regard to the source
of the marijuana, 2) mere
recommendation by a physi-
cian suffices for CUA and
MMPA protection, and 3) the
Vehicle Code statute pro-
hibiting the transporting of
marijuana was subject to a
CUA and MMPA defense
since it was merely an auto-
mobile-specific prohibition upon transporting marijuana.80
The court then addressed the issue of whether marijuana’s
illegality under federal law would permit the City to prevail on
its argument that state law, to the extent that it required the
return of the marijuana, was preempted by federal law.81 The
court acknowledged there was not any exception to criminal
possession of marijuana under federal law, but since state law
enforcement officials act pursuant to state law, they cannot use
federal laws as a mechanism of enforcement in state law pro-
ceedings.82 The court further noted that when Congress
enacted the federal CSA, it did not intend to occupy the entire
area of law that regulates marijuana or controlled substances,83
thus, the court held that federal supremacy principals of pre-
emption did not permit the City to withhold and not return the
marijuana.84
Finally, the court addressed due process considerations
related to returning the marijuana.85 California’s statute on the
destruction of property in the absence of a conviction essen-
tially provides that “seizures of controlled substances, instru-
ments, or paraphernalia. . . shall be destroyed by order of the
court, unless the court finds that [they] were lawfully pos-
sessed by the defendant.”86 Despite the fact that neither the
aforementioned law nor the MML provisions expressly provide
for the return of the marijuana at issue, the court found that,
because Kha was a qualified patient with physician authoriza-
tion to possess the amount seized under state law, due process
considerations of the Fourteenth Amendment required its
return.87 The court concluded by stating it was unable to dis-
cern any justification for the City or its police department to
withhold the marijuana and upheld the trial court’s order.88
Though the Garden Grove court did not explicitly apply the
three-prong test articulated in Wright, it implicitly found the
Wright test was satisfied because 1) Kha was a qualified patient
(first prong) with 2) physician authorization to possess the
amount seized (second prong), and 3) the marijuana was for
Kha’s personal medical use (third prong).89 As will be dis-
cussed, however, public policy concerns could justify perma-
nently withholding medical marijuana subsequent to a valid
traffic stop or vehicle investigation.
IV. PUBLIC SAFETY AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERA-
TIONS TO LIMIT TRANSPORTING AND THE RETURN
OF SEIZED MEDICAL MARIJUANA
Since the Garden Grove rule requires the return of lawfully
seized medical marijuana if the court finds that possession was
lawful, the prosecution must demonstrate possession was
unlawful to avoid operation of the Garden Grove rule.  With the
exception of initial procurement, a patient or caregiver who
transports marijuana in a motor vehicle should be closely scru-
tinized because such is potentially indicative of intent to use
marijuana and then operate a motor vehicle or engage in
unlawful diversion, both of which fall outside of MML protec-
tions.
A. PUBLIC SAFETY AS A LIMITATION UPON THE
TRANSPORTING OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
Both driving under the influence of marijuana and possess-
ing marijuana while driving are dangers to public safety.
1. Inherent Dangers to Public Safety Resulting
from Drugged Driving
California, like many other states with MMLs, has
expressly declared that the CUA does not supersede legis-
lation prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that
endangers others.90 California law prohibits driving under
the influence of alcohol and drugs,91 and as a matter of law
a person’s authorized use of alcohol or a drug does not
normally constitute a defense to a violation.92 As one
court noted,
one way in which use of marijuana most clearly
does affect the general public is in regard to its
effect on driving . . . .  [R]esearch has produced
increasing evidence of significant impairment of
the driving ability of persons under the influence
of cannabis.  Distortion of time perception, impair-
ment of psychomotor function, and increased
selectivity in attentiveness to surroundings appar-
ently can combine to lower driver ability.93
These attending risks to public safety are even more
problematic in instances where a patient’s medical need
for marijuana exceeds the general eight ounce limit
because such a need for larger than usual amounts of med-
ical marijuana necessarily means that heavier and/or more
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frequent use is required by
the patient.  This can
equate to a greater degree of
impairment, in the case of
heavier use, or a continu-
ous state of impairment, in
the case of more frequent
use.  Both of these situa-
tions lend themselves to
heightened public safety
risks when the medicated
patient undertakes to drive.
While it is certainly true
that not all qualified patients are driving under the influ-
ence, the Trippet and Strasburg cases demonstrate that
some qualified patients, if even but a minority, do in fact
smoke marijuana and then drive a motor vehicle.
Though laws prohibiting Driving Under the Influence
(“DUI”) may be sufficient if law enforcement detects
impairment, studies suggest that more than half of the
occurrences of driving under the influence of cannabis
(“DUIC”) may go undetected by the police.94 In addition,
roadside oral drug testing can be inadequate to detect cur-
rent marijuana impairment and DUIC due to inaccura-
cies.95 Furthermore, most marijuana drug tests measure
inactive metabolites of THC, which only confirms past use
and not current impairment.96 Finally, studies have noted
a greater need for intervention by policy makers to guard
against the risks inherent to DUIC.97 Accordingly, DUI
laws do not adequately address the public safety risks
related to DUIC.
2. Restricting the Transporting of Medical
Marijuana to Ensure Public Safety
While a defendant must be a qualified patient prior to
criminal prosecution in order to invoke CUA protec-
tions,98 the general trend among the cases is that where
the qualified patient possesses less than the general eight
ounce quantity limit, the patient is not subject to criminal
prosecution.  This is consistent with the CUA’s purpose of
not imposing criminal liability,99 but this alone does not
necessitate a finding that transporting is in compliance
with law so as to justify the return of lawfully seized mar-
ijuana after a valid traffic stop or police investigation
involving a motor vehicle.
As the cases demonstrate, law enforcement is often
interacting with qualified patients because of a moving
motor vehicle violation.  Many of these moving motor
vehicle violations may in fact be the result of impaired dri-
ving, but - of course - this is not a given.  Nonetheless,
even to the extent that the moving violation is not actually
caused by a qualified patient’s impaired driving, there
seems to be little reason that they should need to drive and
transport marijuana beyond the time it is initially pro-
cured.
The most logical and probable reason a patient would
be transporting medical marijuana with them while they
are driving is because they need or want to use it.
However, a qualified patient who drives while transport-
ing marijuana, with the exception of its initial procure-
ment, seems indicative of intent to operate a motor vehi-
cle subsequent to using marijuana and, irrespective of
whether such act actually be realized, contemplates a use
of medical marijuana - conduct endangering to others -
that is prohibited by the MMLs and, thus, should fall out-
side of the CUA’s protections.  Courts and the general pub-
lic should be skeptical of this situation since the patient is
“not sitting at home nursing an illness with the medicinal
effects of marijuana[,]”100 but, instead, is quite feasibly a
threat to the safety of other motorists.
In Chavez v. Superior Court,101 the court disallowed the
return of marijuana in the absence of a conviction,102
which is contrary to the Garden Grove outcome.  In Chavez,
the defendant was convicted of selling and transporting
marijuana.103 While awaiting the outcome of his appeal,
he was again arrested for having 4.5 pounds of marijuana
as well as possessing living and drying plants.104 His first
conviction was affirmed, and the prosecutor dismissed the
second case.105 Chavez sought a return of the mari-
juana.106 The issue was whether Chavez, a qualified patient
with physician-authorized use, could seek the return of the
second seizure of marijuana, or at least the general eight
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ounce quantity limit the physician recommendation autho-
rized since there was no conviction resulting from the sec-
ond arrest.107 The Chavez court held that withholding and
destroying the marijuana was proper because, although the
case sub judice did not result in conviction, the amount in
possession was unlawful and the law mandated destruction
of unlawfully possessed marijuana.108 The court denied
the petition to return any of the marijuana.109
The Chavez decision demonstrates that the court will
deny the return of marijuana, even in the absence of a con-
viction, when the patient’s possession does not comply
with the CUA.  The reasoning of the Chavez court should
be equally applicable to automobile transporting situa-
tions where a patient’s possession should be rendered
unlawful because his or her actual or intended use of the
marijuana falls outside of MML protections.  In this
instance, however, the laws permitting the transportation
of marijuana, as construed by the Garden Grove court, are
allowing the unfettered transportation of marijuana by a
qualified patient merely because his or her possession is
below the general quantity guideline limit,110 the effect of
which is to tacitly endorse conduct that endangers others
and creates a risk to public safety.  Like Chavez, where the
qualified patient’s intended or actual use of marijuana is
outside the realm of MML protections, his possession
should be viewed as unlawful and, subsequent to seizure,
should permit forfeiture and destruction.  If possession is
found unlawful, medical marijuana may be destroyed,
even in the absence of a conviction.111
The Garden Grove court distinguished Chavez merely
by finding Kha was in lawful possession while Chavez was
not.112 When read together, these cases indicate that the
factor that is determinative of whether seized marijuana
will be returned to a qualified patient is whether the quan-
tity possessed complies with the general quantity limit so
as to let the court find that the qualified patient was or was
not in lawful possession, which in turn does or does not
justify its return.  Notably, however, Garden Grove is a
motor vehicle case while Chavez is not.  A per se rule
requiring the return of medical marijuana, solely because
possession was below the general quantity limit, ignores
the importance of public policy concerns, namely main-
taining roadway safety and preventing diversions.
The court’s role in construing statutes is to “ascertain the
intent of the legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the
law [and, b]ecause the statutory language is generally the
most reliable indicator of that intent, [courts] look first to
the words [of the statutes
while] giving them their
usual and ordinary mean-
ing.”113 However, the
Garden Grove rule of
required return of medical
marijuana certainly impli-
cates, and perhaps arguably
expressly authorizes, actions
that are inconsistent with the
CUA’s prohibitions on con-
duct that endangers others.
Clearly, the state has the
authority, on matters of
public health or safety, to
exert control over individu-
als when their activities
“begin[] to infringe on the rights and welfare of others,”
and the state need not limit the exercise of its police power
to only those activities with a “present and immediate
impact on public welfare” before it can take action.114 It
is in the exercise of those police powers that public safety
should not only justify restrictions upon the transporting
of medical marijuana but also justify its forfeiture follow-
ing seizure from a motor vehicle.
B. PUBLIC POLICY AS A LIMITATION UPON THE
TRANSPORTING OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
In addition to failing to accord adequate consideration to
public safety risks, the Garden Grove rule requiring the return
of marijuana to a qualified patient when the amount is below
the general quantity limit has significant potential to allow the
unlawful diversion of marijuana for nonmedical uses because
it fails to provide a disincentive for transportation-related CUA
abuses.
In People v. Chakos,115 a sheriff requested a marked police
car to stop the defendant’s car.116 Chakos gave consent to a
search of his car, and the police recovered seven grams of mar-
ijuana, $781 in cash, and a physician’s referral authorizing
marijuana use.117 His apartment was also searched, and police
recovered about 6 ounces of marijuana in several different con-
tainers and a digital scale.118 A closed circuit camera was also
present to allow observations of persons coming to the apart-
ment.119 Chakos was arrested for possession for sale and con-
victed based upon the arresting officer’s expert opinion testi-
mony.120 The issue on appeal was whether the officer’s testi-
mony was legally sufficient to sustain the conviction.121 The
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court, applying People v.
Hunt,122 held the officer
lacked qualification as an
expert witness because of
his lack of knowledge and
experience with unlawful
uses of lawfully possessed
substances.123 Since the offi-
cer lacked expert knowledge
to differentiate patterns of
lawful use and unlawful pos-
session for sale, the convic-
tion was reversed.
The Chakos fact pattern
demonstrates a highly suspicious situation where the defen-
dant might have been involved in unlawful drug activity.
However, the Garden Grove rule requiring the return of law-
fully seized marijuana merely because the patient or caregiver
possesses less than the general eight ounce quantity limit has
the effect of thwarting the CUA’s purposes by tacitly sanction-
ing the unlawful diversion of marijuana in contravention to
the CUA’s prohibitions.124
The Garden Grove rule permits a patient or caregiver to use
a motor vehicle for drug distribution activity, raise the CUA as
a defense, and, if successful, have the marijuana returned to
him or her when possession remains below the general eight
ounce quantity limit.  Motor vehicles are often essential to the
illegal transportation and distribution of drugs.  The Strasburg
court observed that the defendant, had his possession been
below the general eight ounce quantity limit, could have
invoked the CUA as a defense.125 Hence, the Garden Grove rule
is unsound, as a matter of public policy, for it not only fails to
provide a disincentive to refrain from diversion-related activi-
ties, but - in fact - promotes abuses of the CUA by returning
unlawfully possessed marijuana to the criminal who success-
fully avoids a conviction merely because possession is below
the general eight ounce quantity limit.
In sum, the public policy of preventing unlawful diversion
warrants a limitation upon the transportation of medical mar-
ijuana.  Subjecting marijuana to forfeiture following lawful
seizure from a motor vehicle furthers this policy by removing
incentives to abuse the CUA.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL PRESUMPTION
Public safety and policy implications should have weighed
more heavily into the Garden Grove decision.  As a matter of
precedent, other courts within California, and perhaps other
states, may concur with the Garden Grove rule.  In such situa-
tions, the prosecution should consider asserting that trans-
porting the marijuana was unlawful because, under the cir-
cumstances, possession is indicative of a use that is an endan-
germent to public safety or diversion-related activities.
In the absence of the courts accepting such an argument, or
a case accepted by the Supreme Court of California on appeal,
corrective measures rest in the hands of the legislature.  To this
end, legislation creating a legal presumption that presumes
medical marijuana is being transported for nonmedical use,
with an exception for the day it is initially procured, is the best
method of addressing safety and policy concerns while afford-
ing qualified patients reasonable medical freedoms the CUA
and other states’ MMLs are intended to provide.
A. A LEGAL PRESUMPTION TO EFFECTUATE PUBLIC
SAFETY AND PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
“A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law
requires to be made from another fact or facts found or . . .
established in the action.”126 California recognizes two types
of rebuttable presumptions, those affecting the burden of pro-
ducing evidence, and those affecting the burden of proof127
(i.e., persuasion).128 A presumption that affects the burden of
proof is intended to “implement some public policy, other than
to facilitate the determination of the particular action,”129 and
“impose[s] upon the party against whom it operates the bur-
den of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact.”130
1. Rationale and Considerations Respecting the
Presumption
A limitation upon the transporting of medical mari-
juana to implement public safety and public policy con-
cerns should strike a balance between furthering the pol-
icy objectives while avoiding any significant erosion to the
CUA’s legal protections.
The rationale underlying the presumption is ensuring
public safety upon the roadways and preventing the diver-
sion of medical marijuana for nonmedical purposes,
including illegal use in addition to illegal sale.  These
objectives are furthered by limiting the transporting of
medical marijuana within motor vehicles, with the excep-
tion of initial procurement, to further policy objectives
because the unnecessary transporting of marijuana indi-
cates unlawful use, namely, conduct that endangers others
through a willingness to drive after use or, alternatively,
diversion for nonmedical purposes.  Permitting forfeiture,
as a civil penalty, prevents the return of medical marijuana
that is presumed to be transported for an impermissible
nonmedical purpose and imposes a consequence for non-
essential transporting.
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2. The Proposed Presumption
This proposed presumption would implement the pub-
lic policies of 1) ensuring motorist safety upon roadways
and 2) deterring the unlawful diversion of medical mari-
juana through transporting.  The proposed presumption
would shift the burden of proof to the qualified patient or
primary caregiver who seeks to avoid the presumption’s
effect and would provide:
Any qualified patient or primary caregiver who,
while having a motor vehicle under his or her direct
and immediate control, is found to possess medical
marijuana after a valid traffic stop or police investi-
gation involving a motor vehicle, is presumed to
possess the medical marijuana for nonmedical pur-
poses.  This presumption shall not apply to any qual-
ified patient or primary caregiver who demonstrates
that the medical marijuana in his or her possession
was obtained within the same calendar day on which
the traffic stop or police investigation involving the
motor vehicle occurred, nor shall this presumption
apply to any criminal proceeding or action, or any
civil suit where the qualified patient or primary care-
giver is a defendant or real party in interest.
The presumption, by presuming possession is for a non-
medical purpose, permits law enforcement to achieve its
goal of effectuating forfeiture to deal with the unique and
problematic issues surrounding medical marijuana in the
context of motor vehicles while preserving state policy of
not subjecting qualified patients or primary caregivers to
criminal penalty.  Since transporting is presumed to be for
a nonmedical purpose and outside of the CUA and MMPA
protections, forfeiture is permitted under California law.131
a. Direct and Immediate Control of a Motor Vehicle
In order for the presumption to apply, the patient or
caregiver must be in possession of medical marijuana
while having a motor vehicle under his or her direct and
immediate control.  The conjunctive “direct and immedi-
ate control” element requires a sufficient nexus between
the patient or caregiver and the motor vehicle for the pre-
sumption to apply.
i. Immediate Control
The “immediate control” requirement ensures there is
a spatial proximity between the patient or caregiver and
the motor vehicle.  Mere investigation regarding medical
marijuana within a motor vehicle that the patient or care-
giver owns will not trigger application of the presumption.
Rather, the immediate control requirement ensures that,
for the presumption to apply, the patient or caregiver must
be within or so close by the vehicle to render his or her
control of the vehicle immediate.
ii. Direct Control
The “direct control”
requirement limits the pre-
sumption’s applicability
even further by ensuring
the limitation upon trans-
porting marijuana is con-
fined to a patient or care-
giver who is or will be dri-
ving.  The patient or care-
giver need not be actually
driving but must have
direct control.  As such,
the presumption would not apply to a patient or caregiver
who is merely a passenger within a vehicle because he or
she is not in direct control of the vehicle; thus, the pre-
sumption and the limitation upon transporting are inap-
plicable.  However, if the patient or caregiver is not driving
but has direct control over the vehicle, where - for exam-
ple - circumstances indicate the patient or caregiver is dri-
ving or will be driving because he or she is or will be the
vehicle’s sole occupant, the presumption and the limita-
tion upon transporting would apply.
Essentially, the “direct and immediate control” require-
ment is broad enough to limit transporting in those situa-
tions where the patient or caregiver is or will be driving,
while not limiting situations where the patient or care-
giver is merely transporting medical marijuana as a non-
driving passenger.  However, as will be discussed, merely
avoiding the application of the presumption, as a non-dri-
ving passenger, does not mean that an individual will suc-
ceed in his or her attempt to transport marijuana for non-
medical purposes.
b. Exception for Same-Day Procurement
The presumption affords a reasonable means of trans-
porting marijuana by a driving patient or caregiver on the
day of initial procurement.  This must be so since, in the
absence of allowing at least some opportunity for trans-
porting marijuana, a patient or caregiver would have no
means of otherwise getting it home to make use of it.  The
courts have rejected the notion that patients should have
a broad right to use or transport marijuana without hin-
drance or inconvenience.132 By precluding the presump-
tion’s operation upon an affirmative showing that the mar-
ijuana was procured on the day of a valid traffic stop or
police investigation involving their motor vehicle, the
patient or caregiver is afforded a window of reasonable
time to transport the marijuana home without subjecting
it to forfeiture subsequent to seizure by law enforcement.
This presumption merely curtails the unrestrained trans-
portation of marijuana to that reasonably necessary to
ensure transportation is limited to medical uses while dis-
suading conduct that endangers others or is an unlawful
diversion.
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is a case involving more than one occupant in the vehicle, but
Strasburg would still be covered by the proposed presumption
since he had direct and immediate control of the vehicle.
c. No Criminal Liability or
Civil Liability in Suits Based
upon In Personam Jurisdiction
The final exception to the
presumption’s applicability
ensures that it is broad enough
to permit the forfeiture of med-
ical marijuana that is trans-
ported unnecessarily while
avoiding the imposition of
criminal or civil liability upon
the patient or caregiver.
i. No Criminal Liability or Sanction
Notably, the CUA, as expanded by the MMPA, pre-
cludes criminal liability for marijuana-related offenses,
including transporting marijuana, solely on the basis of
the qualified patient or primary caregiver’s status.133
The proposed presumption is intended to allow city
and county prosecutors the ability to invoke the presump-
tion to cause a forfeiture of medical marijuana that was
being transported at sometime other than the day it was
initially procured, presumably for a nonmedical purpose.
Hypothetically, the prosecutor could, by invoking the pre-
sumption, first assert possession was unlawful and then
conceivably pursue criminal charges predicated upon the
presumed fact that possession was for an unlawful non-
medical purpose.
However, the presumption, by way of its exception, is
inapplicable to a criminal proceeding or action.  Thus, the
preclusion of the presumption’s operation in any criminal
proceeding ensures that the prosecutor may not piggy-
back a marijuana-related conviction upon the presump-
tion’s effect that the qualified patient or primary caregiver
is not in lawful possession.  Put another way, the pre-
sumption’s exception - in accordance with the CUA’s guar-
antees - prevents the prosecutor from backdooring a crim-
inal charge or conviction after invoking the presumption
of nonmedical use.  In those instances where possession is
presumed unlawful because the patient or caregiver is
unable to affirmatively show same-day procurement, the
marijuana is subject to forfeiture and destruction, but the
patient or caregiver avoids any criminal liability on the
basis of transporting a quantity below the general eight
ounce limit because the presumption has no effect in any
criminal prosecution.  This ensures, in accordance with
the CUA and MMPA, that the qualified patient or primary
caregiver is not subject to criminal liability or sanction on
the sole basis of their status as a patient or caregiver.
ii. No Liability in Civil Suits Based upon In
Personam Jurisdiction
Finally, the presumption is inapplicable to a civil suit
where a patient or caregiver is a defendant or real party in
interest.  This ensures that if a patient or caregiver is sued
in relation to a car accident, or is a real party in interest
with respect to a claim against their insurance carrier, the
presumption is inapplicable and the suing plaintiff must
bear the usual burdens of production and persuasion with
respect to causation in the civil suit.  This prevents a
plaintiff from conceivably initiating a civil suit, after a
motor vehicle investigation and/or citation stemming
from an auto accident involving the patient or caregiver,
and asserting the presumption of nonmedical use as a
basis of liability with respect to causation in the auto acci-
dent.  In effect, the presumption allows a forfeiture of the
marijuana without shifting usual burdens of proof in a
civil suit based upon in personam jurisdiction, which
might be initiated after an auto accident involving a qual-
ified patient or primary caregiver where his or her fault
may be at issue.
iii. Presumption Does Apply to In Rem Proceedings
Notably, the presumption should not be inapplicable to
all civil proceedings per se and this is why only in per-
sonam civil actions are excluded.  “A forfeiture proceeding
is a civil in rem action in which property is considered the
defendant, on the fiction that the property is the guilty
party.”134 Because hearings or proceedings related to the
disposition of marijuana will be required, the presump-
tion’s applicability is preserved for those hearings or pro-
ceedings in which the court’s jurisdiction is in rem with
respect to the marijuana that is to be forfeited under the
presumption of nonmedical use.
3. Evading the Presumption’s Applicability Will
Not Result in Escaping Scrutiny
The proposed presumption creates a bright-line test for
transporting marijuana and presumes possession is for
nonmedical use under certain circumstances and therefore
unlawful.  Though a person could attempt to bypass an
invocation of the presumption by transporting marijuana
as a non-driving passenger in possession, merely avoiding
application of the presumption does not necessarily mean
that an individual will always succeed in his or her
attempt to violate MMLs.
First, it is noteworthy to mention that most motor vehi-
cle cases involving medical marijuana have been situa-
tions where the driver was the sole occupant of the vehi-
cle.135 This may even be more likely where there is delib-
erate intent to circumvent drug laws under cover of med-
ical marijuana’s statutory protections since, presumably,
[M]ost motor
vehicle cases
involving medical
marijuana have
been situations
where the driver
was the sole
occupant of the
vehicle.
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136. While identification cardholders are immune from arrest when
possession is under the general quantity limit, a law-enforcement
officer is not required to accept the identification card as valid if
he or she “has reasonable cause to believe that the information
contained in the card is false or fraudulent, or the card is being
used fraudulently.”  Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.78
(Lexis 2007) (emphasis added).  Thus, attempting to divert mar-
ijuana may still result in arrest.
137. Notably, neither the CUA nor the MMPA afford exemption from
criminal conspiracy, thus, a qualified patient or primary caregiver
- even if registered under the MMPA identification program -
would not be immune from arrest on such a charge, but such
arrests would of course need to be sustainable with probable
cause.
138. Such a legal presumption could likely work in all motor vehicle
scenarios with respect to those states having MMLs or decisional
case law that mandates the return of medical marijuana.
139. Of course a person could refute the underlying fact from which
the presumed fact of “nonmedical use” ensues, but the underly-
ing fact—a valid traffic stop or police investigation involving a
motor vehicle—is not likely to be a disputed issue in the major-
ity of circumstances and, therefore, does not warrant discussion
more than casual mentioning.
the criminal will want to go undetected.  However, with
the exception of same-day procurement, lawful transport
under the proposed presumption would require the assis-
tance of another person to drive the patient or caregiver
who would be the non-driving passenger in possession.
Second, because deliberate attempts to violate MMLs
will require the assistance of a driver to accompany the
non-driving passenger in possession, there is a greater
likelihood of detecting unlawful transporting.  Specifically,
the complicity involved in the criminal enterprise, by
increasing the number of participants, gives rise to a
greater likelihood of detection.
Law enforcement encountering a driver with a non-dri-
ving passenger in possession can undertake heightened
scrutiny of their activities incidental to a vehicle stop or
motor vehicle investigation.  Inquiry can be made into the
surrounding circumstances of the possession, including:
where the driver and passenger are coming from, where
they are going to, and for what purposes. Where circum-
stances warrant, law enforcement can undertake immedi-
ate separation of the driver and passenger for isolated
questioning to assess the truthfulness and consistencies,
or lack thereof, regarding their activities.  If there appears
no discernable reason for transporting the marijuana, the
absence - for example - of a planned out of town trip or
overnight stay away from home, this will alert law enforce-
ment of the possibility that transporting is for unlawful
nonmedical use.
Third, as a consequence and at the very minimum, law
enforcement is alerted to potential criminal activity that
can be further investigated by undercover officers.
Alternatively, though the conduct falls outside of the
scope of the presumption, where law enforcement con-
cludes that the driver and passenger are engaged in unlaw-
ful transporting for nonmedical uses such as diversion for
sale, the non-driving passenger in possession is still sub-
ject to the usual rules of law where they can be arrested,
upon probable cause that a violation is occurring or has
occurred, and required to assert the CUA as their affirma-
tive defense.136 Finally, for the most severe and egregious
situations where the evidence and circumstances demon-
strate a strong inference of illegal activity, the police can
arrest the driver and the non-driving passenger in posses-
sion so the prosecutor may pursue conspiracy charges,
which also serves as a deterrent and punishment for indi-
viduals who would agree to be a driver in the transporting
of marijuana for nonmed-
ical uses.137
In sum, the proposed
statutory presumption,
while permitting a driver
to transport on the same-
day of procurement,
deters the transporting of
medical marijuana for
nonmedical purposes as a
means of ensuring public
safety and addressing
public policy concerns.
This is accomplished by allowing the forfeiture and
destruction of marijuana that was lawfully seized from a
driver subsequent to a valid traffic stop or police investi-
gation involving the patient or caregiver’s motor vehicle,
which - as a practical matter - is when it is most likely to
be encountered by law enforcement.  A patient or care-
giver could avoid operation of the presumption by not
transporting marijuana after the day it is initially pro-
cured.  If transporting medical marijuana is required after
the day it is initially procured, the patient could simply get
someone to drive them.  The presumption affords a lim-
ited yet reasonable allowance for transporting upon an
affirmative showing of same-day procurement.
B. THE PRESUMPTION AND FORFEITURE ARE
CONGRUENT WITH CALIFORNIA LAW
The presumption and any resulting forfeitures, which
reverse the operation of the Garden Grove rule in the motor
vehicle context, are consistent with many facets of California
law.138
1. Requiring Proof of Lawful Transport is in
Accord with Affirmative Defenses
The presumption imposes upon the qualified patient or
caregiver the burden of production and persuasion that
the marijuana was being transported in accordance with
the presumption’s exception for same-day procurement.139
This burden upon the patient or caregiver parallels the
burden of invoking the CUA as an affirmative defense to a
prosecution.  Since the burden of showing lawful trans-
port does nothing more than allocate to the qualified
patient or primary caregiver a burden similar to that
imposed if he or she were seeking protections of the CUA,
A patient or 
caregiver could
avoid operation of
the presumption
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patient or primary caregiver from possessing mar-
ijuana in a place open to the general public if the
possession is limited to that necessary to transport
the marijuana directly to the patient or primary
caregiver or directly to a place where the patient or
primary caregiver may lawfully possess or use the
marijuana[.]142
However, in contrast, the proposed presumption imple-
ments this “necessity of transporting” limitation for the
sake of public safety and policy, while additionally curtail-
ing illegal diversions and drug profiteering.
In Urziceanu, the defendant admitted at trial that he
“would sometimes buy marijuana on the black market by
the pound to supply the [qualified patients].”143 The
Urziceanu case demonstrates that persons who supply
marijuana to qualified patients or primary caregivers may
be acting in an illegal manner.  Worse, there may be
instances where there is no colorable compliance with
MMLs and suppliers are - in fact - drug dealers who are
unlawfully profiteering on the sale of marijuana to
patients and caregivers.
Requiring proof of same-day procurement, as a practi-
cal matter, also requires proof of the source of the mari-
juana.  Empty assertions of same-day procurement are
unlikely to carry the patient’s burden of proof without also
demonstrating or documenting where the marijuana was
obtained.  While the Garden Grove court was correct that,
under the CUA and MMPA, the source of the marijuana
need not be shown to invoke MML protections,144 requir-
ing proof of same-day procurement: 1) encourages the
user to purchase medical marijuana from legitimate dis-
pensaries or cooperatives; 2) favors record-keeping of
medical marijuana-related transactions; 3) requires disclo-
sure of the source and time of procurement of the seized
medical marijuana; and 4) deters profiteering on the
unlawful drug dealing in marijuana since patients and
caregivers will have an incentive to purchase their mari-
juana from authorized sources to ensure its return in the
event of a seizure.
A patient seeking to prove same-day procurement has a
few options.  First, the patient can obtain medical mari-
juana from an authorized source thereby enabling him to
prove same-day procurement if and when necessary.
Second, the patient could provide evidence of procure-
ment from an unauthorized source, which would allow
law enforcement to discover illegal drug dealing in mari-
juana.  Third, the patient may fail or can refuse to prove
same-day procurement of the marijuana, thereby subject-
ing it to forfeiture.
Furthermore, forfeiture of marijuana that is obtained
from a drug dealer is wholly consistent with the purposes
of the forfeiture statutes.  “[C]ivil forfeiture is intended to
the burden-shifting approach is
consistent with the affirmative
defense approach taken by the
MML statutes.
In addition, the presumption
creates a bright-line test for
establishing lawful transport of
medical marijuana.  The Garden
Grove court did not apply or even
acknowledge the Trippet test in
assessing the lawfulness of Kha’s
transportation of medical mari-
juana, despite the fact that the Supreme Court of
California indirectly endorsed it when the Wright case
went up on appeal from the same court issuing the Garden
Grove decision.140 In any event, the presumption provides
a clearly defined standard that readily allows for a deter-
mination of when marijuana should be seized and for its
subsequent disposition without adhering to a rigid rule of
required return as found in the Garden Grove decision, or
a potentially ambiguous factors test as found in the Trippet
test.
Finally, by shifting the burden of proof upon the patient
or caregiver to show that transport is lawful, the People
and the State avoid the problems embodied within the
Hunt decision.  In particular, when the People carry the
burden of showing that an otherwise lawfully possessed
drug, in this case medical marijuana, is being possessed
unlawfully, as when the patient or caregiver is unlawfully
transporting marijuana for nonmedical uses, there arises a
problematic situation that the officer’s testimony may suf-
fer from the infirmity of insufficiency if the court finds
that his or her knowledge or experience is lacking with
respect to the illegal uses of legal drugs, namely medical
marijuana.141 In this regard, by placing the burden of
proof upon the patient or caregiver, any problem regard-
ing the expert qualifications of a testifying officer are alto-
gether avoided.
2. Proof of Lawful Transport Deters Unlawful
Profiteering on Medical Marijuana
Only Alaska has imposed a restriction upon when med-
ical marijuana may be transported, but Alaska’s statute,
unlike the proposed presumption, provides no means -
aside from the driver’s own assertions - that will allow law
enforcement a way to discern whether the transporting of
medical marijuana is “necessary” or is prohibited because
it is unnecessary.  In particular, Alaska law provides:
A patient, primary caregiver, or alternate care-
giver may not engage in the medical use of mari-
juana in plain view of, or in a place open to, the
general public; this paragraph does not prohibit a
Requiring proof
of same-day 
procurement, as
a practical 
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requires proof 
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be remedial by removing the
tools and profits from those
engaged in the illicit drug
trade,”145 with law enforcement
being the principal objective.146
While a patient or caregiver may
be authorized to obtain and use
medical marijuana, marijuana
that was illegally sold by and
procured from a drug dealer
should not lose its status as an
illegal transaction merely
because the patient or caregiver
is authorized to possess it.  To
the contrary, “[a]ll controlled
substances which have been manufactured, distributed,
dispensed, or acquired in violation of [the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act]” are subject to forfeiture.147
Ultimately, forfeiture aids in bifurcating lawful medical
marijuana acquisitions from unlawful drug sales thereby
curtailing the profiteering upon illegal marijuana sales
made to qualified patients and their primary caregivers.
3. Forfeiture Does Not Subject a Patient or
Caregiver to Criminal Liability
As already noted, the CUA precludes criminal liability
of a qualified patient or primary caregiver solely on the
basis of their status,148 but forfeitures are not criminal
sanctions.
In People v. Shanndoah,149 the people appealed a trial
court order dismissing criminal drug charges against the
defendant.150 The trial court dismissed the criminal
charges because the state had previously initiated forfei-
ture proceedings with respect to drug-related money.151
The trial court found that the forfeiture was punitive in
relation to the drug offenses; thus, double jeopardy had
attached and required dismissal of the criminal charges.152
The issue before the Shanndoah court was whether the
monetary forfeiture was a criminal sanction that required
dismissal of subsequent criminal charges that also related
to the drug offenses that gave rise to the forfeiture in the
first instance.153 The court held that forfeitures under the
Health and Safety Code are civil in nature.154 The court
reasoned that “forfeiture prescribed by the Health and
Safety Code is in rem—that is, it is an action against the
property itself [and is] distinct from a criminal proceeding
which is in personam.”155 The trial court’s dismissal of the
criminal charges was reversed.156
Because forfeitures of property under the Health and
Safety Code provisions are deemed civil sanctions, forfei-
tures do not violate the CUA’s prohibitions on criminal lia-
bility.  Accordingly, the forfeiture of medical marijuana
exacts a civil penalty that is directly proportional to the
amount of marijuana unlawfully transported.
Furthermore, even if construed as a criminal sanction,
which it is not, the CUA only prohibits liability for crimi-
nal transportation on the sole basis of a person’s status as
a qualified patient or primary caregiver.157 Forfeiture,
however, only comes into play after medical marijuana is
seized subsequent to a valid traffic stop or a police inves-
tigation involving the motor vehicle, both of which are
based upon probable cause.  Thus, forfeiture is not based
solely on a patient or caregiver’s status but is the conse-
quential result of a seizure stemming from a moving vio-
lation or a police investigation involving the patient or
caregiver’s motor vehicle.
4. Forfeiture Implements Important Policies
Without Overburdening Patients’ Rights
In the context of seizures of medical marijuana from
motor vehicles, a presumption that causes forfeiture
strikes a balance between implementing policies without
overburdening patient rights or needs.
Forfeiture, subsequent to a valid traffic stop or police
investigation involving a motor vehicle, occurs when the
patient or caregiver fails to demonstrate to the court that
transporting occurred on the day of initial procurement.
Forfeiture results for transporting that risks an endanger-
ment to the safety of others and, thus, falls outside of the
CUA’s protections while avoiding significant inconve-
nience or hindrance to the qualified patient who may still
obtain and use marijuana in accordance with the CUA’s
contemplated purposes and protections.  In the end,
endangering conduct and diversion are both unprotected
under the CUA and MMPA, therefore, forfeiture is justi-
fied if the patient or caregiver cannot demonstrate same-
day procurement.
Alternative means, in lieu of a legal presumption that
allows for forfeiture, are inadequate for implementing pol-
icy concerns.  The law could limit how marijuana is trans-
ported.  For example, the transporting of medical mari-
juana might be confined to the trunk of the vehicle or in
a locked container, the later being the case in Vermont,158
but these restrictions are ineffective because, while they
may prevent the use of marijuana while driving, they have
no effect upon driving subsequent to use or upon pre-
venting diversion.
Alternatively, the general quantity limits could be
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reduced, but this may have the effect of not allowing a suf-
ficient quantity of marijuana to treat the illnesses of law-
abiding patients who are not abusing MMLs.  In addition,
a reduction to the general quantity limits unduly burdens
legitimate patients’ rights by restricting possession in situ-
ations beyond the motor vehicle context and without a
direct correlation to the public safety and policy concerns
involving motor vehicles.  In this regard, the presumption
is tailored to implement policies related to specific con-
cerns involving the transporting of medical marijuana
within motor vehicles without overburdening the rights of
patients who are otherwise in compliance with MMLs.
In sum, forfeiture allows local law enforcement and the
state the ability to ensure patients and caregivers are not
abusing MMLs through endangering conduct or diver-
sions while the patient or caregiver’s legitimate need to
transport marijuana remains intact.
C. THE PRESUMPTION IS LIKELY TO SURVIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
To the extent that the proposed statutory presumption is
subjected to constitutional challenge, it is likely to be upheld.
The most probable constitutional challenges, if any, are likely
to be an alleged unconstitutional amendment to the CUA or a
denial of due process.
1. The Issue of Unconstitutional Amendments to
the CUA
Since the Garden Grove decision, there have been cases
addressing the issue of whether the legislatively enacted
MMPA was an unconstitutional amendment to the
CUA.159
In Co. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML,160 San Diego
and San Bernardino counties (collectively “Counties”)
contested the MMPA’s requirement that they implement
and administer the identification card system related to
qualified patients and primary caregivers.161 The issue was
whether the MMPA was preempted by the federal CSA on
the grounds of conflict preemption and obstacle preemp-
tion162 and whether the MMPA’s mandate requiring imple-
mentation of an identification card system was an uncon-
stitutional amendment to the CUA.163 The court held the
Counties’ standing was limited to challenging only those
MMPA provisions requiring implementation of the ID card
program164 and that both
conflict preemption and
obstacle preemption were
unfounded.165 The court
also held that the MMPA
did not amend the
CUA.166 The court rea-
soned that the CSA is
silent on issuance of ID
cards, thus, there could be
no positive conflict.167
Furthermore, issuance of
ID cards was not a “signif-
icant” obstacle to CSA
objectives; thus, obstacle
preemption was inapplica-
ble.168 As to the amendment issue, the court reasoned the
MMPA did not add to the CUA as it was a separate legisla-
tive scheme, CUA protections remained intact, and the ID
card system did not impact the CUA’s protections.169 The
judgment was affirmed.170
Conversely, in People v. Kelly,171 which was decided
before San Diego NORML, the court struck down a MMPA
provision as an unconstitutional amendment.172 In Kelly,
the defendant was a qualified patient who was convicted
for the sale and cultivation of marijuana subsequent to
police seizure of 12 ounces of marijuana in addition to liv-
ing plants.173 The issue was whether the MMPA’s general
eight ounce limitation upon the possession of medical
marijuana, as a legislative enactment, unconstitutionally
amended the CUA thereby rendering it prejudicial error
for the prosecutor to argue that the defendant could be
convicted for possessing more than eight ounces without
a special physician’s prescription.174 The court held that
the general quantity limits within the MMPA were an
unconstitutional amendment to the CUA; thus, the prose-
cutor’s argument in support of the defendant’s conviction
was improper.175 The court reasoned that the only limita-
tion imposed upon possession of medical marijuana under
the CUA was that possession be reasonably related to the
patient’s medical needs, and because the MMPA added
general quantity limitations upon possession, it modified
the CUA and was an unconstitutional amendment.176 The
court struck down the general quantity limitations con-
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tained in the MMPA177 and
reversed the conviction.178
Currently, the Kelly case is
under review before the
California Supreme Court
with the issues limited to
whether the general quantity
limits unconstitutionally
amend the CUA and if there were alternatives to invalida-
tion.179 As the Kelly appellate court noted, “Legislative
acts, such as the MMP, are entitled to a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality[,]”180 but the appellate court’s
opinion is devoid of any attempt to interpret the general
quantity limits with the CUA so that the two may peace-
ably coexist.  Since “[a]n interpretation which gives effect
is preferred to one which makes void[,]”181 the court was
obligated to attempt to reconcile the laws before severing
the purportedly offending law.
Though Kelly could be overturned on the basis of fail-
ing to adhere to the maxims of jurisprudence, the reason-
ing of the San Diego NORML court that the MMPA did not
amend the CUA is equally applicable to the general quan-
tity limitations provision.  The general quantity limitations
at issue in Kelly, like the ID card system at issue in San
Diego NORML, did not add to the CUA as the MMPA is a
separate legislative scheme.  Further, the CUA protections
remain intact, and the general quantity limitation does not
impact the CUA’s protections, as will be explained.
The Kelly court relied on Cal. Lab. Fed’n. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Stand. Bd.182 for the proposition that the
general quantity limitations in the MMPA amounted to an
amendment of the CUA, but Cal. Lab. is distinguishable.  If
the MMPA imposed an absolute cap upon quantity limits,
as did the Budget Act with respect to the attorney fees at
issue in Cal. Lab.,183 then the MMPA’s general quantity
limit would be amendatory.  However, the MMPA did not
impose an absolute limit upon the amount of marijuana
that may be possessed since a patient or caregiver, with a
doctor’s recommendation, “may possess an amount of mar-
ijuana [that is] consistent with the patient’s needs.”184
Accordingly, the general quantity limits specified in the
MMPA, as distinguished from the absolute cap limit
imposed on attorney fees in Cal. Lab., are more akin to a
general guideline as to what a reasonable quantity shall be
for the treatment of illnesses.  Since the general quantity
limit guideline - when read as a whole with other provi-
sions in the MMPA - does not place any absolute limit
upon the amount of marijuana that a patient may possess
or grow, the MMPA’s general quantity limit guideline does
not impact the CUA’s protections since those protections
remain intact.  Specifically, patients may possess and grow
an amount of marijuana that is reasonably necessary for
their condition, even when that amount exceeds the gen-
eral quantity limit guideline.
While a physician’s recommendation is required for
marijuana in excess of the general quantity limit,185 a
physician’s recommendation is also needed for medical
marijuana below the general quantity limit.186 Thus, the
requirement of a physician recommendation designating a
specific amount of medical marijuana that is needed for a
patient’s condition, which exceeds the general quantity
limits, is no more onerous than the requirement that they
seek a recommendation to become a qualified patient in
the first instance.  Accordingly, the MMPA’s general quan-
tity limit neither withdraws protections nor adds obstacles
to a patient’s right to obtain sufficient quantities of mari-
juana for his or her illness; thus, the MMPA did not amend
the CUA.
Finally, “[i]nterpretation must be reasonable,”187 and
the law disfavors constructions that lead to absurd results.
However, severing the general quantity limit from the
MMPA severely impairs an important objective of the CUA
and MMPA by removing the only measurable standard by
which lawful conduct can be ascertained.  The net effect
for non-cardholding qualified patients and primary care-
givers, who are not immune from arrest, is that the judge
or jury must decide whether the amount of marijuana they
possessed was reasonable for their medical condition, after
arrest and prosecution.  Because people will differ in their
own beliefs as to what is reasonable, severing the general
quantity limit brings uncertainty to the law.  Thus, patients
and caregivers may be placed in the compromising posi-
tion that a conviction may ultimately result if, despite their
legitimate need, the amount of marijuana they possess is
found to be unreasonable.  Additionally, the effect upon
cardholding patients is that they, in the absence of evidence
of criminal conduct, may possess excessively large quanti-
ties of marijuana while enjoying immunity from arrest and
prosecution.  When factoring in the current lack of restric-
tions upon transporting and the Garden Grove rule of
required return, we are left with a potentially disastrous set
of laws that seem to favor  illegal drug trafficking.  Severing
the general quantity limit from the MMPA leads to unrea-
sonable and absurd results.
2. The Presumption Within the Framework of an
Amendment to the CUA
The proposed presumption’s limitation upon transport-
ing is incapable of amending the CUA.  Since the MMPA
was a legislative enactment that extended protection from
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criminal prosecution to the crime of transporting,188
which was a punishable offense under the CUA standing
in isolation,189 any limitation upon the unfettered right to
transport medical marijuana is merely a limitation upon a
legislatively granted immunity and cannot be an abroga-
tion of a right granted by voter initiative under the CUA.
Indeed, under the CUA, no such right existed.  As such,
the proposed presumption’s limitation upon transporting
cannot be an amendment to the CUA because the CUA
afforded no right of qualified immunity from prosecution
for transporting.
3. The Presumption Affords Due Process of Law
The Garden Grove court, relying on People v. Lamonte,190
found that the police could not retain Kha’s medical mar-
ijuana without running afoul of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.191 The presumption, how-
ever, satisfies the due process standards articulated in
Lamonte.
In Lamonte, the defendant was arrested after trying to
use fabricated credit cards in a restaurant.192 The police
recovered many items from the defendant’s car including
numerous credit cards, false identification cards, laminat-
ing equipment, various telephone and computer equip-
ment, and a shotgun.193 Lamonte negotiated a guilty plea
to the charges of felon in possession of a firearm and bur-
glary and then sought return of all property, except the
weapons.194 The motion was opposed by the state.195 The
issue was whether the state could withhold property on
the basis that the property items were instrumentalities of
crime.196 The court held that the defendant’s property was
not contraband and must be returned to him.197 The court
reasoned that only contraband was excepted from return
and merely using a lawful item in the commission of a
crime does not make it contraband.198 The court directed
the property to be returned.
“Contraband is goods or merchandise whose importa-
tion, exportation, or possession is forbidden.”199 Since the
presumption presumes that possession of marijuana
within a vehicle is for nonmedical use and unlawful, the
reasoning of the Lamonte court would permit forfeiture
subsequent to a lawful seizure.  The marijuana that is pre-
sumed for nonmedical use is unlawful contraband and, as
the Lamonte court noted that contraband does not need to
be returned,200 the marijuana seized - applying Lamonte -
would not need to be returned.
Second, as the Lamonte court appropriately noted, “[t]he
confiscation and destruction of property without a hearing,
proceeding or other forum to determine whether the prop-
erty was dangerous, illegal to possess or otherwise excepted
from return to the owner is an unconstitutional deprivation
of property without due process of law.”201 However, the
presumption affords the patient or caregiver an opportunity,
through judicial process, to assert that the presumption is
inapplicable because the marijuana was procured on the
same day in which the traffic stop or motor vehicle investi-
gation occurred.  Thus, because the patient or caregiver
would be afforded a hearing to determine the legal or illegal
character of the seized marijuana, the operation of the pre-
sumption satisfies due process of law.
Ultimately, the presumption’s operation, with respect to
qualified patients and primary caregivers who transport
marijuana in motor vehicles, is likely to be upheld as con-
stitutional because it does not amend the CUA, nor does
it offend due process of law.
CONCLUSION
Medical marijuana laws are intended to afford suffering or
ill patients a means of relief that conventional prescription
medications are unable to provide.  However, there are well-
documented abuses of medical marijuana laws by persons who
would attempt to subvert their intended purposes while invok-
ing the protections the statutes afford.  In this regard, the non-
essential transporting of marijuana by a qualified patient or
primary caregiver who is driving should be viewed as conduct
that indicates an intent to use or possess marijuana in a way
that is not contemplated under MMLs - namely engaging in
conduct that endangers others and/or unlawful diversions for
nonmedical use - and, thus, should be viewed as outside MML
protections.  In those states adhering to a rule requiring the
return of lawfully seized medical marijuana, a legal presump-
tion that effectuates a forfeiture of marijuana that is legally
seized subsequent to a valid traffic stop or motor vehicle inves-
tigation may be a viable means of implementing public safety
and public policy concerns related to highway safety and drug
enforcement efforts.
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ONLINE
CENTER FOR SENTENCING 
INITIATIVES, NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS
http://www.ncsconline.org/csi/index.
html 
The National Center for State Courts
has a new section on its website devoted
to discussion and research about sen-
tencing issues.  The website explores the
expanded use of evidence-based sen-
tencing practices, as well as risk- and
need-assessment information that may
help in identifying sentencing options
that can best protect the public, reduce
recidivism, and hold offenders account-
able.  The website was set up with assis-
tance from the Public Safety
Performance Project of the Pew
Charitable Trusts’ Center on the States
and the State Justice Institute.
The Conference of Chief Justices and
Conference of State Court
Administrators adopted a resolution in
2007 endorsing the increased use of evi-
dence-based sentencing practices.  The
resolution concluded that “the use of
validated ‘offender risk and need assess-
ment tools’ is critical in reducing recidi-
vism” and urged states “to adopt sen-
tencing and correction policies and pro-
grams based on the best research evi-
dence of practices shown to be effective
in reducing recidivism.”   Judges and
policy makers can turn to this new web-
site to stay up-to-date on research in this
area.
There are already several useful
reports and resources on the website.
We note a few of them here.
BRIAN J. OSTRUM, CHARLES W. OSTROM,
ROGER A. HANSON & MATTHEW KLEIMAN,
ASSESSING CONSISTENCY AND FAIRNESS IN
SENTENCING:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN
THREE STATES (2008).
These researchers at the National Center
for State Courts studied sentencing pat-
terns in three states that use substan-
tially different systems of sentencing
guidelines:  Minnesota, which has a rel-
atively strict system; Michigan, which
allows more judicial discretion; and
Virginia, where compliance with the rec-
ommended sentences is voluntary.  The
study reported these key findings:
• Guidelines do make sentences more
predictable.  Predictability was highest
in Minnesota and lowest in Virginia.
• Guidelines effectively limit disparities
in sentencing based on characteristics
such as race and economic impact.
The study found that the influence of
those factors was negligible in all
three of these states, even Virginia
with its voluntary guidelines:  “A vol-
untary guideline system with substan-
tial sentencing ranges does not neces-
sarily lead to increases in discrimina-
tion, as many observers might have
expected.”
• Guidelines make sentencing patterns
more transparent.
• State officials have many options
available to them when designing sen-
tencing guidelines.
• Active participation by a sentencing
commission is an essential part of an
effective guideline-sentencing system.
NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM,
STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES:  PROFILES
AND CONTINUUM (2008).  
This report reviews sentencing-guide-
lines systems in 21 states, placing them
on a continuum from the most volun-
tary to the most mandatory.  Judges and
policy makers may find this review of
interest in identifying states that have
similar systems:  judges might find rele-
vant caselaw in a state with similar pro-
visions, while policy makers may be
interested in states both similar and
divergent.
ROGER K. WARREN, EVIDENCE-BASED
PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE JUDICIARIES
(2007).
Roger Warren, a former California judge
and past National Center for State
Courts president, makes the case for
applying evidence-based sentencing
practices to reduce recidivism.  Warren
reviews research about what works in
reducing recidivism; he crystallizes the
research into a set of evidenced-based
practices.  A detailed review of drug
courts, which have implemented many
evidence-based practices in sentencing,
is included.  Warren emphasizes ways in
which judges can enhance reduced
recidivism.   In addition to evidence-
based practices, he reviews procedural-
fairness concepts that can lead to greater
acceptance of court outcomes and to
defendants taking responsibility for
their own conduct.   
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD
1943–2007
Los Angeles Times Obituary:
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/23/
local/me-whitebread23
Law professor Charles H.
Whitebread, who reviewed the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court at
the American Judges Association’s
annual education conference for more
than 25 years, died September 16, 2007.
He was 65.
He taught at the University of
Southern California law school from
1981 to 2008; before that, he taught at
the University of Virginia law school
from 1968 to 1981.  
Whitebread’s presentations at AJA
conferences were the highlight of each
year’s annual meeting.  Whitebread also
wrote a summary of the past year’s cases
each year for Court Review, and he
served on Court Review’s editorial board
from 1998 until his death.  Some
remembrances of him are found at page
4 of this issue.  For those who would
like to read an obituary, a good one ran
in the September 23, 2008, Los Angeles
Times (Valerie J. Nelson, Supreme Court
Expert Taught at USC, available on
Westlaw at 2008 WLNR 18054334).  
In its obituary, the Times reported
that Whitebread’s popularity was
reflected in a Facebook group called,
“Charlie Whitebread Rocks My World.”
The group had more than 1,600 mem-
bers.
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